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ABSTRACT 
The number of merger and acquisition (M&A) transactions paid fully in stock in the U.S. market 
declined sharply after 2001, when pooling and goodwill amortization were abolished by the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board. Did this accounting rule change really have such far reaching 
implications? Using a differences-in-differences test and Canada as a counterfactual, this study 
reveals that it did. We also report several other results confirming the role of pooling abolishment, 
including (i) that the decrease in full stock payment relates to CEO incentives and (ii) that previously 
documented determinants of the M&A mode of payment cannot explain the post pooling abolishment 
pattern. These results are also robust to controls for various factors, such as the Internet bubble, the 
exclusion of cross-border deals, the presence of Canadian cross-listed firms, the use of a constant 
sample of acquirers across the pooling and post pooling abolishment periods, the use of Europe as an 
alternative counterfactual, and controls for the SEC Rule 10b-18 share repurchase safe harbor 
amendments of 2003.  
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 Over the past 25 years, U.S. merger and acquisition (M&A) transactions that have been fully 
paid in stock have displayed a striking pattern: from half of all transactions characterized by this 
payment mode during the 1990s, the percentage has fallen to around 10% in recent years (value-based 
percentages). This long-term evolution has mostly remained unnoticed in the academic community1. 
We investigate the causes of this long-term evolution. 
 There has been much research into payment mode choices in M&A transactions in corporate 
finance because this topic offers a fertile ground for testing theories and developing a modern view of 
the firm. Betton et al. (2008) identify four factors that drive payment mode choices: taxes (Section 
368 of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code), information asymmetries (Eckbo et al. 1990; Fishman 1989; 
Hansen 1987), capital structure and control (Harris and Raviv 1988; Stulz 1988), and agency-based 
and behavioral arguments (Jensen 2005; Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan 2004; Shleifer and Vishny 
2003). Considerable empirical literature has tested the corresponding predictions. For example, in 
early research, Travlos (1987) established that equity transaction announcements generated negative 
market reactions of about 1% for acquisitions of public companies. More recently, Fuller et al. (2002) 
show that market reactions to stock-paid transactions depend on the consideration offered but also on 
the target’s status, such that they generate positive market reactions if the target is a private company.  
The long-term marginalization of fully stock-paid M&A transactions offers a unique context 
for investigating whether classic payment mode theories represent first-order drivers of payment 
mode choice. To explain the shift in balance toward more cash payments, some of these determinants 
must have undergone a significant evolution. Identifying them would provide an ex post confirmation 
of their importance. Boone et al. (2014) seek to do so using a predictive model of payment mode 
choice, built on many determinants from extant literature. Yet their model can only partially explain 
the observed time trend in M&A payment modes. Boone et al. also note that other variables could be 
correlated by coincidence with the evolution in payment modes and conclude that “propensities (to 
use mixed payments and stock) cannot be explained by our measures designed to capture traditional 
theories for the payment choice” (Boone et al. 2014, p. 297). Identifying the main driver of the 
marginalization of full stock payments in the U.S. thus remains an open issue.  
Figure 1 delivers a second puzzling observation: the long-term decrease in full stock 
payments started in 2001 and the 1990–2000 sub-period displayed no clear trend. In 2000, 62% of 
transactions were fully paid in stock, but only 23% remained so in 2003. This decline then continued, 
but at a slower pace, the percentage of fully stock-paid transactions fluctuating around 10% from 
2010 and after. We accordingly note that the Statements of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) 
141 and 142 were adopted in June 2001. SFAS 141 dropped the pooling method of accounting for 
M&A transactions, imposing de facto, the purchase method application to all transactions. SFAS 142 
1 Amel-Zadeh et al. (2015), for example, referencing several prior contributions, states, inter alia, that “Four 
historical developments are at work. First, a large and increasing proportion of the purchase consideration in 
M&A consists not of cash but of acquirers’ shares”. 
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abolished the goodwill amortization principle, replacing it by a yearly impairment test procedure. The 
pooling method of accounting, based on Accounting Principles Board (APB) Opinion 16 from 1970, 
consists of the simple addition of the income and balance sheet items to produce the new merged 
entity financial statements. The purchase method instead imposes a reevaluation of the target’s assets 
and liabilities at fair value and the recognition of goodwill if a difference exists between the paid price 
and the reevaluated net assets. If they opted for pooling,2 acquirers could avoid potential penalizing 
effects on their financial ratios due to their acquisitions3. The synchronicity between the sharp drop in 
the evolution of fully stock-paid M&A transaction frequency and adoptions of SFAS 141 and 142 is 
questioning. Can these accounting rule changes help explain the marginalization of full stock 
payments in U.S. M&A transactions? The question is worthy of investigation not only because of the 
importance of the M&A mode of payment choice in itself but because the question of whether 
accounting rules matter for economic agents is still largely open to debate in the academic community 
(Amel-Zadeh et al., 2015).  
Ali and Kravet (2014) contribute to this suspicion. The authors study the implications of 
pooling abolishment on two M&A outcomes: the mode of payment and the takeover probability. They 
focus on the role of the Step-Up (the difference between the purchase price and the target’s book 
value of net assets) because this conditions the financial reporting implications of pooling. Their main 
finding concerning the mode of payment choice is to uncover a positive relation between the target 
Step-Up and full stock payment during the pooling period, that disappears after pooling abolishment. 
Ali and Kravet (2014) infer from this observation that pooling has driven full stock payment before 
2001. The authors also suggest that pooling abolishment has decreased the probability of full stock 
payment since 2001, even if this trend is not observable in their particular sample. Other evidence of 
the importance of pooling as a determinant of the payment mode has been reported in the literature. In 
the specific case of AT&T’s acquisition of NCR, Lys and Vincent (1995) note for example that 
AT&T decided to pay fully in stock in order to qualify for pooling.  
The adoptions of SFAS 141 and 142 were one-time experiences and, around them, many 
synchronous events may have had an effect. Nearly any variable displaying a structural break after 
2001 could appear to be a statistically significant determinant of the evolution in full stock payments.4 
For example, in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks, the U.S. Federal Reserve drastically 
lowered its federal fund target rate to avoid an economic recession. This change in interest rate policy 
affected the cost of raising cash to finance M&A transactions. The bursting of the Internet bubble also 
was contemporaneous with SFAS 141 and 142 but also strongly affected the M&A market activity, 
2 More accurately, pooling was not really an option but rather the consequence of fulfilling 12 criteria (see 
Section 2). Acquirers could structure their transactions to meet these criteria though. 
3 Purchase accounting in the case of fully-stock paid acquisition is most often depicted in the literature as 
penalizing financial ratios such as earnings per share (EPS), return on equity (ROE) or return on assets (ROA) 
as compared to pooling (see Reda, 1999). We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out that, in fact, it 
depends on the valuation and operating performance ratios of the acquirer and the target. 
4 A classic case of spurious regression in time-series analysis (Granger and Newbold 1974). 
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especially in high-tech industries, and stock paid transactions are known to be more frequent in high 
growth industries (Eckbo et al., 2015). Therefore, to test for a causal relation between pooling 
abolishment and the marginalization of the full stock payment in the U.S., we need an identification 
strategy.  
 To apply one, we use Canada as a counterfactual for the U.S. as before 2001 pooling was also 
allowed under the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA) Handbook Section 1580. In 
2001, as in the U.S., this possibility was abolished under the CICA Handbook Section 1581. 
Moreover, the U.S. and Canadian economies are closely tied, so Canada is a prime candidate to serve 
as a counterfactual, as Eckbo (1992) suggested in his effort to identify a possible deterrence effect of 
M&A regulations. In support of our identification strategy, we note first that the U.S. and Canadian 
conditions for pooling, before its abolishment, differed substantially. In the Canadian case, under the 
CICA Handbook Section 1580, pooling was allowed only if one of the parties could not be readily 
identified as the acquirer. This strict restriction led to very limited uses of pooling during the 1990s. 
Accordingly, the abolishment of pooling in Canada would likely have had, at best, a very limited 
impact on incentives to opt for stock as a payment medium. In this sense, pooling abolishment in 
Canada acts as a placebo for the “medication” of pooling abolishment in the U.S. The 
contemporaneous abolishment of pooling in the U.S. and Canada contributes to our identification 
strategy. Common shocks to the U.S. and Canadian economies are controlled for using the 
differences-in-differences test that we implement and therefore, time synchronicity strengthens the 
control for these sources of latent factors. Recently, Cedergren et al. (2015) also use Canada as a 
counterfactual for the US experience to control for endogeneity concerns in their study of the relation 
between goodwill amortization abolishment and acquisition profitability and risk. 
 For our baseline analyses, we collected two large M&A transaction samples from the 
Thomson SDC database for the 1990–2014 period: one for the U.S. and one for Canada. We used 
identical selection criteria: deal size above USD 1 million, public acquirers (no restriction on target 
status), a ratio of deal value to acquirer size of at least 1%, exchange offers, acquisition of assets, 
acquisition of certain assets, buybacks, recaps and acquisition (of stock) excluded, the percentage of 
shares acquired between 50% and 100%, 100% of shares held after the transaction, the consideration 
offered reported in the Thomson SDC database, and financial acquirers (SIC codes 6000 to 6999) 
excluded. The samples comprise 6,955 U.S. and 1,712 Canadian transactions. 
 We start by reporting stylized facts about payment mode choices over the 25-year period. As 
Figure 1 highlights, full stock payments declined abruptly after 2001 in the U.S., but that was not the 
case in Canada, as confirmed by a Chow test of the structural break. After providing the descriptive 
statistics for a set of traditionally observed determinants of M&A payment choices, we estimate a 
linear probability model for stock payment choices in the U.S. and Canada. The results confirm that 
the data sets are comparable to previous studies; we find similar historical results.  
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 For the main analysis, we merge the U.S. and Canadian samples and use a differences-in-
differences test, which is robust to many potential sources of bias (Roberts and Whited, 2013). We 
identify pooling and post–pooling abolishment periods, then test whether full stock payments declined 
significantly more in the U.S. than in Canada after pooling abolishment. They did; this result is 
statistically highly significant, such that the probability of opting for full stock payments shrank by 
more than 20 percentage points (pp) (or 30 pp, depending on the differences-in-differences 
specification) in the U.S. during the post pooling period, compared with Canada. This result provides 
strong support to the thesis of pooling abolishment being a main driver of full stock payment 
marginalization in the U.S. 
Among the additional analyses we provide, we attempt to identify the channel through which 
pooling abolishment might have had such a significant impact on the M&A market. Healy (1985) 
points out that when executives are rewarded by earnings-based bonuses, they are more likely to 
select accrual policies and accounting procedures favorable to them. We therefore anticipate that 
pooling abolishment should have had a stronger influence on payment choices when CEO incentives 
are closely tied to financial performance (as CEOs are key decision makers in M&A processes; 
Harding and Rovit, 2004). Our results support this prediction, indicating that reported financial 
performance matters for CEOs and suggesting one channel through which pooling abolishment has 
affected the M&A mode of payment choice. In contrast, we find that the combined evolution of 
classic determinants fails to explain the evolution of full stock payments, according to a comparison 
of their predictive power between the U.S. and Canada in the post pooling period. This result 
corroborates the mixed results reported by Boone et al. (2014).  
We also study whether, in the U.S., the acquirers who selected full stock payments changed 
between the pooling and the post pooling periods. We find that after 2001, acquirers paying in stock 
are smaller and more leveraged, own more tangible assets, distribute dividends more often, more 
frequently enter in international transactions and target more specifically public firms. By identifying 
the real change in acquirers’ profiles and the characteristics of full stock payment transactions after 
the abolishment of pooling, we corroborate the material impacts of this abolishment on the M&A 
market.  
As another complementary investigation, we test whether U.S. deals that probably would have 
used pooling, if it were still allowed, were paid in stock during the post pooling period. They were 
not, thus providing further evidence that pooling represented a motivation to pay in stock during the 
1990s, a result consistent with Ali and Kravet (2015).  
We then address the value consequences of the abolishment for U.S. acquirers. We show that 
acquirers’ cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) around the announcement of a stock-paid M&A 
transaction fell by 4.63 pp for public targets in the post pooling period compared with the pooling 
period. This value effect is highly significant, both economically and statistically.  
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We finally provide the results of a long list of robustness checks for the baseline analysis, 
such as excluding high-technology firms in order to control for the Internet bubble, excluding cross-
border deals, or using Europe as a counterfactual instead of Canada (among others). As we detail 
subsequently, all the robustness checks confirmed the baseline results. 
With these findings, this article contributes to the M&A payment choice literature. We first 
document the sharp decrease in full stock payment since 2001. We then show that the determinants 
suggested in traditional finance literature are poor at explaining this evolution. Pooling abolishment 
instead appears to be a first-order factor. This result contributes to the financial regulation literature 
by showing how far-reaching a change in accounting principles can be for the M&A market. Our 
results also contribute to the CEO compensation contract literature by pinpointing how incentives 
shape behavior. These insights are of first-order importance considering the weight of the M&A 
market as a channel for resource allocations (Andrade et al., 2001).  
 
1. Data 
Our baseline M&A data for both the U.S. and Canadian data5 came from the Thomson SDC 
database, with a set of selection criteria similar to those used by Betton et al. (2008): 
- Deal size greater than USD 1 million; 
- Public acquirers (but no restriction on target status); 
- Ratio of the deal value to the acquirer size of at least 1%; 
- Exchange offers, acquisition of assets, acquisition of certain assets, buybacks, recaps, and 
acquisition (of stock) excluded; 
- Percentage of shares acquired between 50% and 100%; 
- 100% of shares held after the transaction; 
- The consideration offered is reported in the Thomson SDC database; 
- Financial acquirers (SIC codes 6000 to 6999) excluded. 
Table 1 contains the number and aggregate value (2010 constant USD) of transactions by year in the 
U.S. and Canadian samples. The wave of M&As at the end of the 1990s is clearly apparent in the U.S. 
sample, particularly for value-based statistics. That period witnessed gigantic, wealth-destroying 
transactions (Moeller et al., 2005). The rebirth of M&A market activity around 2004–2006 appears in 
both samples, though with some lag for the Canadian case. The Canadian sample was tiny in the early 
1990s, reflecting our relative deal size selection restriction. Computing the relative size requires 
collecting the acquirer’s market value, which is difficult in the Canadian sample for transactions in the 
early 1990s. André et al. (2004) cite the same challenge. Because we used the Canadian pooling and 
post subsamples as the control group in our differences-in-differences test, with 266 transactions 
5 Sample sizes vary from analysis to analysis, depending on the control variables and data availability 
constraints. 
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between 1990 and 2001 and 1,446 transactions between 2001 and 2014, we have sufficient 
observations. Moreover, the relatively smaller sample size, if anything, reduces the statistical power 
of the analyses, thus offering a more conservative test.  
 We collected market data from the CRSP Database for the U.S. and Datastream for Canada. If 
the prices or number of shares required to compute the market values were unavailable in these 
databases, we collected market values from the Thomson SDC Database (AMV field). We used the 
Compustat Merged database for U.S. firms’ financial statements and the Compustat North America 
database for Canadian ones. Macro-economic information (interest rates, consumer price index, credit 
spread) were from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’s Economics Data website.6 
 
2. Stylized Facts About the M&A Method of Payment  
 
2.1. Evolution of Full Stock Payments over Time 
Table 2 contains the time series of fully stock-paid M&A transaction percentages in the U.S. 
and Canada, in value (2010 constant USD) and count. As observed in Figure 1, the U.S. time series 
exhibits a sharp decline in 2001 and 2002, which then continues at a reduced pace. No such evolution 
appears in Canada (yearly average stock-paid transaction percentages in value are 37.22% during 
1990–2001 and 37.21% during 2002–2014; the corresponding count-based percentages are 47.01% 
and 46.48%). To confirm the significantly different evolutions between the U.S. and Canada, we 
implement a Chow test of structural break for both countries: 
 
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 %𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽 𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 +  𝛾𝛾 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 +  𝛿𝛿 �𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡  × 𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡� + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡  (1) 
 
where 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 %𝑡𝑡 is the fully stock-paid transaction percentage in year 𝑠𝑠7,  𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 is a dummy 
variable equal to one during the post period (2002 onward), 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 is a linear time trend variable, 
and 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡  × 𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 is the interaction between the linear time trend and the 𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 dummy 
variable. We test for the presence of a structural break in 2001 with the joint test of significance 𝛽𝛽 =
𝛿𝛿 = 0.  
For the U.S. time series, the 𝛽𝛽 coefficient is negative (significant, p = 0.07), and the Fisher 
statistic Chow test of the structural break is 12.44 (highly significant, p = .00), confirming the 
presence of a structural break in 2001. The Canadian experience differs fundamentally: The 𝛽𝛽 
coefficient is positive but not significant, and the Fisher statistic is 0.27 (not significant, p = 0.76), so 
6 See https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/ 
7 We obtain similar results when using value-based fully stock-paid percentages. 
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there was no structural break.8 In the U.S. data, the interaction term 𝛿𝛿 coefficient is not statistically 
significant either. That is to say, the structural break is driven by a change in level, not slope. 
 
2.2. Determinants of Stock Payment 
We used a large set of determinants of the M&A mode of payment, as identified by prior 
M&A literature (Eckbo et al. 2014): deal size (USD million), acquirer size (USD million), cash 
holding, market-to-book ratio, asset tangibility, research and development (R&D), dividend payments, 
leverage ratio, target status, relative size, horizontal deal, domestic deal, and the 10-year Treasury 
bond interest rate. All the variable definitions are in Appendix 1.  
Table 3 Panel A reports the descriptive statistics for the U.S. (Panel A.1) and Canada (Panel 
A.2). The first three columns refer to the whole period, 1990 to 2014, and include the mean, median, 
and standard deviation. The next columns display the means by pre and post pooling periods; finally, 
we provide the p-value results of a classic test of the difference in means across the two sub-periods. 
The U.S. sample differs from the one that Eckbo et al. (2014) use, in that the covered periods are 
different. Eckbo et al. (2014) gather a sample of 4,919 U.S. transactions from Thomson SDC over 
1980 to 2008, whereas we focus on the 1990 to 2014 period. Although the measures of the acquirer’s 
market-to-book ratio (2.56 in our sample vs. 3.06 in Eckbo et al.), leverage (15% vs. 16.9%), and 
asset tangibility (38.9% vs. 42.9%) are comparable, our acquirers are significantly smaller (USD 
1,256 million in average total assets – unreported - .vs USD 3,218 million), pay dividends less 
frequently (24% vs. 44%), and do more R&D (6.1% of total assets vs. 4.4%). Concerning 
comparisons between the pre and post pooling periods, for both the U.S. and Canada, we find 
significant differences, which importantly raises the question of whether these evolutions can explain 
the observed decline in frequency of full stock payments during the post pooling period. In the U.S., 
the deal size, acquirer size, cash holdings, relative size, and frequency of horizontal transactions all 
increase. The acquirer’s market-to-book ratio and asset tangibility both decrease, as do the frequency 
of public targets, domestic transactions, and 10-year Treasury bond interest rate levels. In Canada, the 
evolutions of the acquirer’s size, cash holdings, asset tangibility, frequency of public targets, domestic 
deals, and 10-year Treasury bond interest rate are comparable to those for the U.S. However, we 
observe three differences: an increase in acquirer R&D (absent in the U.S.), a decrease in acquirer 
leverage (absent in the U.S.) and a decrease in relative size (increasing in the U.S.). In a Panel B, we 
report descriptive statistics for 20 additional variables used in complementary analyses with the U.S. 
sample. For each variable, the reported figures refer to the total number of available observations. 
These displayed statistics are of the same order of magnitude as reported in previous studies for 
comparable samples (see Betton et al., 2008; Harford and Li, 2007). 
8 We drop the years to 1990–1993 for the Canadian analysis, to avoid the potential for bias if the results 
depended on years with only a limited number of recorded transactions.  
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 For more insight into the comparability of our sample with extant samples, we also reproduce 
the classic multivariate probability of stock payment analysis. Yet we opt for a linear probability 
model; most studies instead use a nonlinear model, because their dependent variable is binary. Our 
choice is motivated by our willingness to test the statistical significance of the coefficient variations 
between the pooling and post pooling periods. This test can easily be implemented by merging 
observations from the two periods into one common sample and including interaction terms between 
the variables of interest and a Postpool dummy variable. However, the interaction term coefficients in 
nonlinear models are not marginal effects and therefore must be interpreted with care (Greene 2010). 
The linear probability model is immune to this issue9.  
 As the results in Table 4 indicate, the coefficient estimates for the U.S. sample are close to 
those reported by Eckbo et al. (2014): acquirer market-to-book ratio and R&D increase the probability 
of full stock payments; dividend payments and leverage decrease it. Acquirer size and asset tangibility 
retain the same signs, but the former loses its significance, and the latter was not significant in Eckbo 
et al.10 Despite the compositional differences revealed in Table 3, our sample thus appears 
representative of classic samples used in prior M&A literature to study the determinants of payment 
choice. Finally, the comparison of the multivariate analyses for the U.S. and Canada indicates that, 
with the exception of acquirer tangibility, all the statistically significant U.S. coefficients retain their 
signs in the Canadian case (and mostly remain statistically significant). These results strengthen our 
decision to use Canada as a counterfactual for the U.S. pooling abolishment experience. 
 
3. Pooling Interests versus Purchase Accounting Methods  
 
 To test whether pooling abolishment drove the marginalization of full stock payments in the 
U.S., we first summarize the relevant accounting regulations in both nations. This initial analysis is 
important to understand why Canada is a valid counterfactual, namely, because pooling was possible 
in Canada before 2001. 
 
3.1. The U.S. Case  
The SFAS 141 and 142 introduced two major reforms in 2001: abolishing the pooling of 
interests method11 and goodwill amortization.12 Before 2001, M&A accounting methods followed 
APB Opinion 16, from 1970, which allowed two methods: pooling of interests and purchase. With the 
9 Note that valid interpretation of interaction terms in non-linear models remains a subject of debate (Kolasinski 
and Siegel, 2010) 
10 We cannot compare the results for the public target dummy, because Eckbo et al. also include an interaction 
term with the target premium. 
11 Note that SFAS 141 evolved in 2008 to become SFAS 141R. The purchase method was relabeled the 
acquisition method, and the changes made the acquisition method less attractive in some circumstances. But 
according to Ali and Kravet (2014), this change affected only a small minority of transactions. 
12 SFAS 142 replaced goodwill amortization with impairments, based on yearly assessments of goodwill value.  
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pooling method, a simple sum of the income and balance sheet statements of the two merging 
companies served as the input for the financial statements of the newly merged entity. This procedure 
avoided any asset reevaluations or goodwill recognition. The purchase method instead used a fair-
value reevaluation of target assets and liabilities before incorporating them into the acquirer’s 
financial statements. If the acquisition price represented a premium with respect to the fair-value re-
evaluation process, as was the case especially at the end of the nineties due to the increase in market 
valuations, a goodwill was recognized. Before 2001, this goodwill had to be amortized over its useful 
life, with a maximum of 40 years (APB Opinion 17). Another significant difference between pooling 
and purchase involved the day on which target net incomes were taken into account in the newly 
merged financial statements. Pooling required such consideration from the beginning of the fiscal year 
whereas under the purchase method, it began with the acquisition date.  
Before 2001, the M&A accounting method was not, strictly speaking, a choice. Rather, APB 
Opinion 16 listed 12 criteria that, if met, led to pooling. The merging parties structured their 
transactions to fulfill (or not) these criteria. The general idea was that pooling should apply to mergers 
of equals, so the main criteria were autonomy (i.e., merging companies could not be divisions or 
subsidiaries of one another in the two years before the merger), a single transaction (merger should be 
a one-step process, completed within a year of its initiation), and an essentially stock-for-stock 
transaction (at least 90% of the paid price).13 The method was common for large M&A transactions in 
the U.S., as Figure 2 displays. It indicates the average percentage of M&A transactions using pooling 
with deal sizes greater than USD 100 million that were fully paid by stock during 1990–2001 (source: 
Thomson SDC Database). Panel A displays count-based percentages, and Panel B contains value-
based percentages. Pooling was used for more than one out of two transactions. Reda (1999) reports 
that, in 1997, the dollar volume of pooling exceeded that of purchase by a factor of 20 in the U.S. 
Thus, the pooling method was the method of choice for large, U.S., M&A transactions paid for fully 
by stock.  
With this stylized fact, several researchers have compared the effects of pooling and purchase 
rules on financial ratios such as the EPS and ROA of the newly merged entity. The general view is 
that purchase accounting degrades them relative to pooling (see Reda, 1999). But this depends in fact 
on the market valuations and operating performance levels of the acquirer and the target as well as on 
the financial ratios under consideration14. To gain a better understanding of this issue, we have to 
disentangle changes in earnings (the numerator of financial ratios) from changes in total assets or 
number of shares outstanding (their denominators). On the numerator side, by imposing goodwill 
amortization, purchase accounting penalizes the performance. But during the pooling period, financial 
analysts and investors were mostly looking at operating performance excluding goodwill 
amortization. In such cases, effects of purchase accounting are limited. Moreover, adoptions of SFAS 
13 The remaining nine criteria imposed strict restrictions on the voting right changes for common stocks. 
14 We thank an anonymous referee for providing us with a very clear analysis of this issue. 
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141 and SFAS 142 were contemporaneous. The abolishment of pooling therefore went concurrently 
with the abolishment of goodwill amortization (and its replacement by yearly impairment tests). 
Switching from the pre SFAS 141 and SFAS 142 regime to the post one had, therefore, most probably 
a limited impact on the earnings side, at least as viewed by financial analysts and investors. On the 
denominator side, the situation depends on whether we focus on the number shares outstanding or on 
total assets. Concerning the number of shares outstanding, full stock payment imposed by pooling 
mechanically leads to its increase15. Switching from the pooling period to the post pooling periods 
released the full stock payment constraint and led to an increase in EPS if acquirers opted more 
frequently for cash or mixed payment modes. For financial ratios scaled by total assets such as ROA, 
the fair valuation process imposed by purchase accounting unambiguously leads to an increase in the 
denominator. Hence, pooling abolishment penalized reported ROA of newly merged entities. 
Anticipating the net effects of pooling abolishment on financial ratios reported by new merged entities 
is clearly subtler than it may appear at first sight. It depends on the financial ratio considered, the 
financial market valuation level and the comparative situation of the acquirer and the target both in 
terms of valuation and operating performances. Even the target past accounting practice matters 
because it impacts the fair valuation process imposed by purchase accounting. 
Beyond the effects on reported financial ratios, SFAS 141 and SFAS 142, impose asset fair 
valuation and yearly impairment tests, which may have promoted transparency and efficiency of 
capital allocation in the M&A market. In particular, the yearly impairment test procedure imposed by 
SFAS 142 is a channel through which overpayment is revealed to shareholders. This mechanism put 
CEOs (and other M&A decision makers) under fire in case of overpayment by disclosing poor pricing 
decisions, imposing de facto a stronger market discipline in the M&A market. Consequently, adoption 
of SFAS 141 and 142 did not only drop pooling and goodwill amortization but also affected the M&A 
market resource allocation processes, a potential confounding factor. 
Several researchers have considered the relation between pooling and the choice of payment 
methods, as well as managers’ motivations to choose pooling and the value effect for shareholders. 
Ali and Kravet (2014) use the adoption of SFAS 141 and 142 as a kind of natural experiment to study 
the relation between accounting regulations, the financing used in M&A transactions and the takeover 
probability. As noted previously, they focus on the role of the target Step-Up because this variable 
conditions the financial reporting implications of choosing pooling. They establish a positive relation 
between the Step-Up and the probability of stock-for-stock financing before 2001. However, this 
relation disappears after the abolishment of pooling and goodwill amortization, leading the authors to 
infer that pooling was an important driver of stock-for-stock financing choices during the pooling 
period. The authors also suggest that pooling abolishment has decreased the probability of full stock 
payment since 2001 but do not provide supportive evidence. The frequency of full stock payment 
15 It must be noted however that the number of new shares issued depends on the acquirer’s market value and 
the bid premium. In times of high market valuations, the increase in number of shares outstanding may be less. 
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does not decrease significantly in their sample after 2001 (Ali and Kravet (2014), Table 1)16, and also 
their logit regressions incorporate yearly fixed-effects, hiding any trend regarding the frequency of 
fully stock-paid transactions. Moreover, in the absence of a clear identification strategy, inferring a 
causal effect between pooling abolishment and the probability of full stock payment is open to the 
classic omitted variables bias. Ayers et al. (2002) confirm that firms using pooling were ready to pay 
higher acquisition premia. Weber (2004) also studies market reactions to the Security Exchange 
Commission’s (SEC) adoption of SAB 96, a new regulation that forced firms to choose between 
pooling and undertaking share repurchase programs in the two years following an acquisition. Most 
firms with pending pooling mergers at the time of SAB 96 adoption maintained pooling as an 
accounting method, at the cost of renouncing share repurchase programs. Therefore, pooling appears 
to have a real cost to shareholders. Aboody et al. (2000) further report that pooling was more likely 
when managers received earnings-based compensation, raising the issue of conflicts of interest with 
shareholders. With a sample of 324 U.S. stock swap acquisitions between 1990 and 1998, Martinez-
Jerez (2008) reports a negative, statistically significant difference in market reactions to pooling 
versus purchase transactions, of approximately -4 pp, though the differential grows to -8 pp for firms 
with ineffective corporate governance. The authors conclude that investors interpret the choice of a 
purchase accounting method as a signal of management’s confidence in the success of the transaction. 
 
3.2. The Canadian Case  
 Before 2001, Canadian regulations allowed the use of pooling (CICA Handbook Section 
158017), though they were far more restrictive. Two conditions had to be met: the transaction had to 
be accomplished by an exchange of voting shares and it had to be impossible to identify one of the 
combining firms as the acquirer18. Because the merger partner with more than fifty percent of the 
combined firm is assumed to be the acquirer, practically speaking, pooling might seem to work only 
for combinations of firms of equal size. But Canadian Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
(GAAP) also had other rules to determine the status of “acquirer” (CICA Handbook Section 1581): 
e.g., the entity that transfers cash or other assets or incurs liabilities, the entity that issues equity 
interests, the relative voting rights in the combined entity after the business combination, the existence 
of a large non-controlling interest in the combined entity if no other owners hold the largest non-
controlling voting interest in the combined entity, the composition of the governing body or the senior 
management of the newly merged entity, the terms of exchange of equity interests and the entity that 
initiated the transaction. Given so many criteria, an acquirer could usually be identified and pooling 
16 Regressing the percentage of fully-stock paid transactions reported in Ali and Kravet (2014) Table 1 on a post 
pooling dummy variable (equal to one in 2002 and onward) reveals a coefficient not statistically different from 
0. 
17 See the CICA Exposure Draft on business combinations from September 1999. 
18 According to Farrell and Beechy (2002, p. 92), “if one company can be identified as the acquirer, then there is 
a widespread agreement that the purchase method should be used.” 
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was uncommon. According to André et al. (2004), among 267 transactions undertaken during 1980–
2000, only 8 (3% of the sample) relied on pooling. Figure 2 confirms this evidence for the 1990–2001 
period, for a sample limited to transactions with a deal size greater than USD 100 million and paid 
fully by stock: pooling was seven times (four times) more frequent in the U.S. than in Canada 
according to count- (value-) based percentages. Then, the pooling method was abolished in 2001 
under CICA Handbook Section 1581.  
The Canadian experience is particularly interesting with respect to our research question. The 
pooling abolishment year is the same as that in the U.S., and the nations are close, with closely tied 
economic environments (Eckbo 1992; Cedergren et al. 2015). The very restrictive pooling usage 
conditions in Canada meant that this approach had, at most, a very limited material impact on the 
payment choice by construction: pooling abolishment in the Canadian case plays the role of a placebo 
in our research design, like in medical experimentation. The time synchronicity strengthens the ability 
of our differences-in-differences test to control for common shocks affecting the U.S. and Canadian 
economies simultaneously. These arguments motivate our choice of Canada as a counterfactual for 
the U.S. experience.  
 
4. Full Stock Payment and Pooling Accounting Abolishment 
 
4.1. Differences-in-Differences Tests 
 In this section, we explicitly test whether pooling abolishment is a valid candidate for 
explaining the evolution in full stock payments in the U.S. The differences-in-differences test, with 
Canada as a counterfactual, should be robust to misspecification-based sources of bias, including 
endogenous missing variables (Roberts and Whited 2013). As argued in Section 3.2, business 
combinations were infrequently accounted for under pooling in Canada before pooling abolishment 
and this allows us to use Canada as a placebo with respect to the U.S. case. Moreover, the 
simultaneous abolishment of pooling in the U.S. and Canada coupled with a differences-in-differences 
test controls for shocks common to both economies. Accordingly, we adopt two differences-in-
differences specifications (Greene, 2011): 
 
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾 𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 +  𝛿𝛿 �𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖  × 𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖� + 𝜽𝜽′(𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺 𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑖𝑖) + 𝝋𝝋′(𝑪𝑪𝑺𝑺𝑪𝑪𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑖𝑖) + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖, and (2) 
 
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿 �𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖  × 𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖� + 𝜸𝜸 (𝒀𝒀𝑺𝑺𝒀𝒀𝑺𝑺 𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝒊𝒊) + 𝜽𝜽′(𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺 𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑖𝑖) + 𝝋𝝋′(𝑪𝑪𝑺𝑺𝑪𝑪𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑖𝑖) + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖, (3) 
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where 𝑝𝑝 is the deal index, 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 is a dummy variable equal to 1 for a full stock payment for deal 𝑝𝑝, 
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the acquirer is a U.S. firm but 0 if the acquirer is a Canadian 
firm, 𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 is dummy variable equal to 1 if the deal 𝑝𝑝 announcement date is during the post period 
(after 06/30/2001), 𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺 𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝒊𝒊 is a vector of sector fixed effects (defined at the SIC two-digit level), 
𝒀𝒀𝑺𝑺𝒀𝒀𝑺𝑺 𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝒊𝒊 is a vector of year fixed effects, and 𝑪𝑪𝑺𝑺𝑪𝑪𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝒊𝒊 is vector of control variables. We use bold 
notation to identify vectors. The set of control variables is the same as in Table 4.  
 Our two differences-in-differences specifications are linear probability models (LPM), which 
are generally less well suited to the analysis of binary dependent variables than probit or logit 
specifications. However, we selected this estimator because Equations 2 and 3 both incorporate 
interaction terms. Coefficients of interaction terms in nonlinear models cannot be interpreted as 
marginal effects (Greene, 2010), but in a linear specification, they are. Adopting LPM specifications 
therefore facilitates the interpretation of our results. The Equation 2 specification is a classic 
differences-in-differences test implementation in a multivariate context. We also report the results 
obtained with the Equation 3 specification, that corresponds to the logit specification used in Ali and 
Kravet (2014), because it includes year fixed effects controls for time-varying common factors that 
are not explicitly included in the vector of control variables (e.g., macro-economic variables). The 
𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 dummy cannot be included in this second specification though, because it is a linear 
combination of the set of year fixed effects. 
 In Table 5, we report the results from estimating Equations 2 and 3 in the first two columns. 
The M&A sample is the one we introduced in Section 1, though restricted to transactions for which all 
the required data fields are available. All control variables are as defined in Appendix 1. In Figure 3, 
we display the evolution of full stock payment frequencies in the U.S. (Panel A) and Canada (Panel 
B) as the red continuous line.  The parallel trends assumption underlying a valid differences-in-
differences test implementation is clearly respected, except for years at the very beginning of the 
sample period, for which the Canadian sample size is limited (see Table 1). 
 The test of the pooling abolishment hypothesis relied on the interaction term 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖  × 𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 
with coefficient 𝛿𝛿 for Equations 2 and 3. In Table 5, Column 1, the coefficient value is -0.3134 (p = 
0.00), and in Column 2, it is -0.2099 (p = 0.00). These estimates strongly support the pooling 
abolishment hypothesis: In contrast with the Canadian experience, full stock payments declined in the 
U.S. in the wake of pooling abolishment. The result is robust to our introduction of a large set of 
determinants of the M&A mode of payment, industry-level latent factors that were constant over time, 
and annual common latent factors. The properties of the differences-in-differences specification also 
make it robust to any latent factors common to the U.S. and Canada. Moreover, the sizable coefficient 
values indicated a decline of 20 to 30 pp in the probability of a full stock payment during the post 
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period.19 Finally, among the control variables, in comparison with the results obtained for the U.S. 
during 1990–2014 (Table 4), the coefficients of acquirer leverage, market-to-book ratio, tangibility, 
dividend, R&D, domestic transaction, public target, and 10-year interest rate kept their signs and 
statistical significance. Results reported in Column 2 are particularly interesting with respect to the 
potentially confounding role of the pooling abolishment market discipline effect highlighted in 
Section 3.1. Year fixed effects absorb any latent factors affecting the M&A market as a whole20.   
 
5. Additional Evidence  
5.1. CEO Incentives and Full Stock Payment Probability 
Pooling and purchase methods of accounting have significantly different consequences for the 
new merged entity, in terms of its displayed financial ratios (see Section 3.1). Executives whose 
compensation packages depended on financial performance indicators such as EPS or ROA had clear 
incentives to opt for full stock payments during the pooling period. Healy (1985) already points out 
that when executives are rewarded by earnings-based bonuses, they are more likely to adopt 
accounting rules that are more favorable to them. Consistently, Aboody et al. (2000) report that 
pooling was more likely in large target Step-Up transactions when managers received earnings-based 
compensation. CEO incentives therefore might provide a channel to explain the interaction between 
pooling and the choice of payment methods in M&A transactions.  
To study role of CEO incentives, we compute the percentage of CEO variable compensation 
using the Execucomp database. We next reproduce the LPM of the full stock payment in the U.S. 
(Table 4) but adding this time the percentage of variable CEO compensation and its interaction with 
the Postpool dummy variable.21 The sample size decreased drastically (from 5,337 observations to 
1,146), due to the limited data availability in the Execucomp database.  
Table 6, Panel A, displays the estimation results. We report four specifications, depending on 
whether the independent variables of interest and the year and sector fixed effects are included. The 
two independent variables of interest are % Variable Compensation and its interaction with the 
Postpool dummy variable. The former is positive but not significant in all specifications (Column 2, 
0.1012, p = 0.20; Column 3, 0.0839, p = 0.31; Column 4, 0.0943, p = 0.23). In these same columns, 
the latter coefficient was negative and highly significant (-0.2863, p = 0.01; -0.2625, p = 0.02; -
19 These results are confirmed in Appendix 2, using a probit specification. The interpretation of the interaction 
term coefficients must be handled with care in this nonlinear context (Greene 2010), but we note that the 
coefficients are negative and highly significant in both specifications (Column 1, -1.0183, p = 0.00; Column 2 -
0.6918, p = 0.00). 
20 In order to further investigate the potential confounding  role of the pooling abolishment market discipline 
effect, we replicate the analysis adding the bid premium as an additional control variable. As this variable is 
mostly available only for the U.S. transactions, this robustness check relies on a treatment effect approach. We 
obtain qualitatively similar results as the ones reported in Table 5 (available on request). This evidence confirms 
that our results are robust to the potential market discipline effect.  
21 We cannot replicate the Table 5 differences-in-differences specification, because CEO compensation 
packages are not available for Canadian acquirers. 
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0.2748, p = 0.01). The addition of % Variable Compensation and its interaction with the Postpool 
coefficient provides us the net effect of % Variable Compensation during the post pooling period. We 
obtain a negative value that is significantly different from 0 (Fisher statistics: 5.78, p = 0.02; 4.74, p = 
0.03; 5.83, p = 0.02). This suggests that when CEOs of acquirers earn a high proportion of variable 
compensation, they were less likely to use full stock payments after pooling abolishment. These 
results suggest that CEO incentives help explain the interaction between pooling abolishment and the 
marginalization of full stock payments in the U.S. When we compare the Column 1 results with those 
in Columns 2 and 3, we find that half of the post–pooling abolishment effect was due to CEO 
incentives. That is, in Column 1, the Postpool coefficient is -0.4358, and in Columns 2 and 3, it shrinks 
to -0.2382 and -0.259 respectively, or roughly the half.  
In Table 6, Panel B, we report results corresponding to Table 6, Panel A, Column 4 
(specification with year and sector FE) by subsamples of high and low acquirer Return on Assets 
(Columns 1 and 2) and high and low acquirer Market to Book ratios (Columns 3 and 4).  High (Low) 
ROA corresponds to the subsample of acquirers with Return on Assets above (below) the sample 
median Return on Assets. The same criteria apply to High (Low) MTB, using the acquirer Market to 
Book ratio. Sample medians are recomputed each year. The Fisher test of % Variable Compensation 
net effect is statistically significant for the low Return on Assets acquirer (Column 2, Fisher statistics: 
6.55, p = 0.01) and the high Market to Book (Column 3, Fisher statistics: 2.87, p = 0.09) acquirer 
subsamples. The dependence between the % Variable Compensation net effect statistical significance 
and acquirer samples split according performance and valuation ratios is an additional indication that 
CEO incentives matter in the choice of the mode of payment. But in the absence of the detailed 
specification of the CEO compensation package (in particular, the financial indicators on which it 
depends), we have to remain cautious about the interpretation of coefficient signs obtained from 
subsamples. 
 
5.2. Classic Determinants of M&A Mode of Payment  
 Can the marginalization of full stock payments in the U.S. be explained by the determinants 
of the M&A mode of payment classically used in M&A literature? To investigate this question, we 
study the predictive power of the determinants during the post period, using an empirical strategy 
similar to Boone et al.’s (2014): we model the probability of full stock payments using an LPM 
specification and the set of determinants in Table 3. The estimates of the LPM model coefficients rely 
on the subsample of transactions that took place during the pooling period. We then use those 
estimated coefficients to obtain the fitted probabilities of full stock payments, during both the pooling 
and post pooling periods. Finally, we average the deal level fitted probabilities, year by year.22 Table 
7 displays the results, with the U.S. estimations in Panel A and the Canadian estimations in Panel B. 
22 However, in contrast with Boone et al. (2014), our sample includes private target acquisitions, and fitted 
probabilities are strictly based on out-of-sample predictions for the post pooling period. 
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In each panel, the left-hand column contains the estimation results for the pooling period, as used in 
this analysis. The average fitted probabilities are depicted in Figure 3, in addition to the observed 
frequencies of full stock payment. As is clearly apparent in Figure 3, Panel A, the LPM model 
captures the average probability of full stock payment during the pooling period (in-sample) 
reasonably well for the U.S., but it cannot explain the sharp decline during the post pooling period. 
The comparison with the Canadian results (Figure 3, Panel B) is striking. With the exception of the 
first few years (1990–1992), for which our sample is very limited (Section 1), the LPM captures the 
average probability of full stock payments correctly, but in this case, it can do so for both the pooling 
and post pooling periods. The analysis of Table 7, Panel B estimation results indicates that this is the 
case despite there being only one statistically significant independent variable in the Canadian case 
(essentially Acquirer Research and Development, with p = 0.02) These observations lead us to 
conclude that the known determinants of stock payments do not drive the full stock payment 
marginalization in the U.S. after 2001, in confirmation of Boone et al.’s (2014) results. Because 
participation in the M&A market is a voluntary decision, endogenous self-selection may affect these 
results. We therefore replicated the exercise using a two-stage Heckman procedure, but the results 
were similar (available on request).  
 
5.3. Classic Determinants of M&A Mode of Payment: Pooling versus Post-Pooling Periods 
The results in Table 7 also offer an opportunity to compare the classic determinants’ 
coefficients across the pooling and post pooling periods. In each panel of Table 7, we report estimates 
for the pooling (left) and post pooling (right) periods, as well as the test of coefficient differences. In 
the U.S. (Table 7, Panel A), the acquirer size, leverage, tangibility, and dividend coefficients change 
signs between periods, and the changes are statistically significant. The domestic and public target 
dummies keep their signs, but the changes in their coefficient values are significant. The pooling 
abolishment changed the profile of acquirers active in the M&A market, as well as the type of 
transactions undertaken. This result corroborates the prediction that a change in accounting 
regulations has material impacts on the M&A market. The situation in Canada is different. Results 
must be interpreted with caution because most explanatory variables are not statistically significant at 
the usual confidence levels. We observe nevertheless that significant evolutions appear for only two 
variable coefficients: acquirer cash (which becomes negative and significant in the post period) and 
the public target dummy (which is positive but only significant during the post period).  
 
5.4. Probability of Full Stock Payment and Pooling 
 If pooling was a main motivation to pay in stock during 1990–2001 in the U.S., acquirers who 
would have chosen pooling should not pay more frequently in stock than other acquirers do after the 
pooling abolishment. We test this prediction using a two-stage approach. In the first stage, we 
estimate the probability of pooling during the pooling period. In the second stage, using fitted 
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probabilities of pooling obtained from the first-stage estimates, we study whether the probability of 
pooling still explains full stock payments during the post pooling period. The first-stage estimated 
equation is 
 
𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 = Φ�𝛼𝛼 + 𝝋𝝋′(𝑪𝑪𝑺𝑺𝑪𝑪𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑖𝑖)�,     (4) 
 
where 𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the transaction was recognized under pooling, Φ(. ) 
indicates a probit specification, and 𝑪𝑪𝑺𝑺𝑪𝑪𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑖𝑖 is a set of control variables that explains the choice to 
structure an acquisition to make it eligible for pooling. Ayers (2002) highlights the role of the target’s 
Step-Up, ROA, and leverage. This time, we select a probit specification, because there is no 
interaction term in Equation 4.  
 In the second stage, similar to the analyses reported in Table 5, we test two LPM 
specifications, one without year fixed effects and one with them:  
 
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽 𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾 𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝 ℎ𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 +  𝛿𝛿 �𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖  × 𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝 ℎ𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖� + 𝜽𝜽′(𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺 𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑖𝑖) +  𝝋𝝋′(𝑪𝑪𝑺𝑺𝑪𝑪𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑖𝑖) + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖, and  (5) 
 
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛾𝛾 𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝 ℎ𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 +  𝛿𝛿 �𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 × 𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝 ℎ𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖� + 𝜸𝜸 (𝒀𝒀𝑺𝑺𝒀𝒀𝑺𝑺 𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝒊𝒊) + 𝜽𝜽′(𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺 𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑖𝑖) +  𝝋𝝋′(𝑪𝑪𝑺𝑺𝑪𝑪𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑖𝑖) + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖  . (6) 
 
The variable 𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝 ℎ𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠 refers to the fitted probabilities of pooling, obtained using Equation 4. 
Finally, 𝛿𝛿, the coefficient of the interaction terms 𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 × 𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝 ℎ𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖, is the coefficient of 
interest.  
 Table 8, Panel A, displays the results of the estimation of Equation 4, obtained using M&A 
transactions from 1990 to 2001 in the U.S.23 As suggested by Ayers (2002), the target’s Step-Up, 
ROA, and leverage have significant roles. Other control variables are also significant, including the 
target’s size (positive coefficient) and the acquirer’s dividend (negative coefficient), run up (positive 
coefficient), and manufacturing industries (negative coefficient).  
 Table 8, Panel B, contains the results of the estimations of Equations 5 and 6, which we 
obtained using the sample of U.S. M&A transactions for which we could access all necessary 
information. The two key coefficients are those for 𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝 ℎ𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 and the interaction term, 
𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 × 𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝 ℎ𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖. The former is positive and highly significant in both specifications 
(Column 1, 0.9336, p = 0.00; Column 2, 0.8419, p = 0.00). Acquirers interested in pooling selected 
23 The significant sample size reduction is due to the need for data for computing target firm variables, such as 
the Step-Up and ROA. 
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full stock payments more often during the pooling period. This finding must be the case, because full 
stock payment was a necessary condition for pooling (Section 3). The coefficient of 𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ×
𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝 ℎ𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 is negative and also highly significant (Column 1, -1.1326, p = 0.00; Column 2, -
0.9740, p = 0.00). When we add the coefficients of 𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝 ℎ𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 and 𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 × 𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝 ℎ𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 to 
obtain the net effect of 𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝 ℎ𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 during the post pooling period, we obtain a value close to 0 (not 
significantly different from 0; unreported result). This is the anticipated result if pooling was a main 
reason to select full stock payment. That is, acquirers wishing to opt for pooling had no more 
opportunity to do so during the post pooling period, so they stopped paying in stock more frequently 
than other acquirers.  
 
5.5. Value Effects  
 Fuller et al. (2002) and Officer et al. (2009) show that the mode of payment interacts with the 
target status to determine acquirer value creation in M&A transactions. The most value-creating 
transactions for acquirers are those of private targets paid in stock. Private target acquisitions are more 
value-creating for acquirers than are public ones, possibly because of the presence of an illiquidity 
premium captured by acquirers. Moreover, relative to cash payments, the use of stock payment 
enables acquirers to transfer part of target valuation uncertainty to target shareholders (more so for 
private targets because of the lack of a market price). The acquisition of public targets paid in stock 
instead is the most value-destroying combination, because it combines a size effect with a share 
exchange offer, both of which generate negative investor reactions (Golubov et al. 2016; Moeller et 
al. 2004).  
Our results show that the abolishment of pooling in 2001 (SFAS 141) represents a main 
explanation of full stock payment marginalization in the U.S. after 2001. In Section 5.3 we detailed 
how the stock-paid transaction characteristics and corresponding acquirer profiles changed after the 
pooling abolishment. Here, we investigate whether these changes affected investors’ perceptions of 
the value creation surrounding the transactions. 
 We start by computing the acquirer CAR for our U.S. sample (see Section 1). We use the 
standard market model as a return-generating process, estimated on a window from day -300 to day -
90, with respect to the announcement date. The acquirer CAR are for a three-day event window, 
centered on the announcement date. We then regressed acquirer CAR on the set of classical 
determinants (Golubov et al. 2015) and dummy variables that capture the post pooling period 
(Postpool), the target’s status (public target), and full stock payment (stock).  
 Table 9 contains the results. Column 1 includes only the classic acquirer CAR determinants, 
for comparison with existing results. Similar to Fuller et al. (2002) and Officer et al. (2009), we 
observe that acquiring public targets is negatively perceived by investors, and the effect is reinforced 
by full stock payments. We add the dummy variables—post pooling, public target, and stock—and 
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their interactions in Column 2. The 𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝  × Stock × Public Target interaction coefficient is 
negative and highly significant (-0.0463, p = 0.01), indicating that investors react far more negatively 
to acquisition announcements for public targets with full payment in stock after pooling abolishment. 
Noting that fully stock-paid transactions display significant changes in acquirer profiles and deal 
characteristics in the post pooling period (Section 5.3), we determine that the pooling abolishment has 
transformed this segment of M&A activity. Only less value-creating or more value-destroying 
transactions of public targets continue to be fully paid in stock, and full stock payment conveys more 
negative private information about acquirers. 
 
6. Robustness Checks 
 
 We investigate the robustness of the Table 5 results, reflecting our baseline differences-in-
differences test of the pooling abolishment hypothesis, to various issues that could lead to misleading 
conclusions. To start, 2001 was the year SFAS 141 and 142 were adopted, but also the Internet bubble 
burst year. Did this contemporaneous event drive our results? In Table 10, Panel A, we present a 
replication of the Table 5 tests after exclusion of high-tech firms, which we identify using Kile and 
Phillips’s (2009) method. These authors provide a detailed list of four-digit SIC industries that can be 
considered high-tech. After excluding them, our sample size dropped from 6,123 observations in 
Table 5 to 3,273 observations in Table 10. The coefficients of the U.S. dummy × Postpool dummy 
interaction term remained negative and highly significant (Column 1, -0.2410, p = 0.00; Column 2, -
0.1777, p = 0.00). The bursting of the Internet bubble thus is not a confounding factor. This result 
also indicates that pooling relevance during the 1990s was not restricted to high-tech industries, as 
was frequently suggested by the financial press at this time. 
 If cross-border transactions are asymmetrically distributed between the U.S. and Canada and 
also underwent specific time trends after 2001, they also could act as confounding factors. We 
replicated our preceding analysis, but this time we excluded cross-border transactions. The results in 
Table 10, Panel B stem from a sample size of 5,174 transactions. The coefficients of the U.S. dummy 
× Postpool dummy interaction term became even more negative and highly significant (Column 1, -
0.3693, p = 0.00; Column 2, -0.2214, p = 0.00). 
 The pooling and post-pooling subsamples of acquirers each incorporate a reduced number of 
identical firms. As we reported in Section 5.3, in the U.S., the determinants of full stock payment 
underwent significant changes between the two periods. Might this variation in the composition of the 
acquirer samples affect the estimation results? To check, we selected a subsample of U.S. acquirers 
that undertook at least one transaction in the five years before the pooling abolishment and another 
transaction in the five years following it. We refer to this subsample as the constant acquirer sample, 
and we present the pertinent results in Table 10, Panel C. The sample size dropped drastically to 971 
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observations. The coefficients of the U.S. dummy × Postpool dummy interaction term remain negative 
and highly significant again (Column 1, -0.3431, p = 0.00; Column 2, -0.2079, p = 0.00).  
 Many Canadian companies are listed on U.S. capital markets, as well as Canadian markets, 
which defines them as cross-listed firms. If the cross-listing decision was motivated by the search for 
easier conditions for pooling in the U.S., the presence of these cross-listed firms could affect our 
results.24 We check the robustness of our Table 5 results to this issue by adding a dummy variable, 
Canadian Cross-listed, equal to 1 if a firm was cross-listed. According to Table 10, Panel D, the 
coefficients of the U.S. dummy × Postpool dummy interaction effect remains negative and highly 
significant (Column 1, -0.3231, p = 0.00; Column 2, -0.2147, p = 0.00). An alternative robustness test 
dropped Canadian cross-listed firms from the sample; in doing so, we obtained comparable results 
(available on request) but a drastically reduced Canadian firm sample size. 
The use of pooling was very limited in European countries, whether because it was forbidden 
by country-specific regulations or because of their restrictive conditions, similar to those in Canada 
(Amel-Zadeh et al., 2015).25 Europe therefore qualifies as another valid counterfactual for our 
differences-in-differences test. We extracted, from Thomson SDC, M&A transactions completed by 
European acquirers, using the same criteria that we describe in Section 1. The resulting sample of 
6,285 transactions involves companies in 41 European countries, though U.K. firms account for more 
than 58% of them. In Figure 4, we present the yearly average percentages of fully stock-paid 
transactions, in count-based values, for European and U.K. samples compared with the U.S. one. The 
European and U.K. patterns are very different from the U.S. one, displaying no systematic decline 
after 2001. For example, the yearly average stock-paid transaction percentages for Europe (UK) were 
20.76% (17.44%) during 1990–2001 and then 17.59% (13.77%) during 2002–2014. The parallel 
trends assumption underlying a valid differences-in-differences test implementation is clearly 
respected again; the European and U.K. samples displayed behaviors similar to the U.S. sample both 
before and after the pooling abolishment. The U.S. post pooling abolishment fully paid stock 
transaction frequency also rejoined the long-term averages for Europe; this observation should prompt 
further investigation. Table 10, Panel E, provides the results for Europe (including the U.K.); Panel F 
focuses on the subsample of U.K. acquirers. In Panel E, Column 1, the coefficient value is -0.2221 (p 
= 0.00), and in Column 2, it is -0.2241 (p = 0.00). These estimates strongly support the pooling 
abolishment hypothesis, because in contrast with the European experience, full stock payments 
declined significantly in the U.S. after the pooling abolishment. The result is also robust to the 
24 Canadian cross-listed firms did not use pooling more often than single-listed Canadian firms before the 
abolishment, an observation which is inconsistent with the idea that pooling might have motivated the cross-
listing. 
25Thomson SDC reports only 32 deals recognized under pooling in Europe since 1978, among 25,088 
transactions with deal sizes greater than USD 1 million completed by public acquirers. 
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introduction of the control variables,26 industry-level latent factors constant through time, and annual 
common latent factors27.  
 A main contribution of our analyses is the demonstrated use of differences-in-differences tests 
with valid counterfactuals. In Section 3, we detailed the U.S. and Canadian accounting regulations to 
explain why Canada was so well suited to serve as a counterfactual; in this section, we describe how 
Europe is qualified as well. We finally apply a classic treatment effect test for the pooling abolishment 
hypothesis, avoiding non–U.S. transactions as the counterfactual. Specifically,  
- for a given M&A transaction, we define the treatment as the announcement date taking place 
during the post-period; 
- we use propensity score-matching estimators to impute the missing counterfactual for each 
transaction as the outcome of the most similar transaction that also took place during the 
pooling period. The outcome of this transaction is the potential outcome; 
- we compute the treatment effect by taking the average of the differences between the 
observed and potential outcomes for each subject.  
A detailed presentation of this procedure is available from Roberts and Whited (2013). We used 
acquirer and transaction characteristics to estimate the treatment model. Table 10, Panel G, displays 
the treatment effect test results: the average treatment effect is negative and strongly significant (-
0.3320, p =0 .00), consistent with our results in Table 5. Let us also mention that we replicate this 
exercise using the same set of control variables as in Ali and Kravet (2014). Our sample is this time 
reduced to 1,159 observations because of limited data availability for un-listed targets. We obtain 
comparable results (available on request).  
 Rule 10b-18 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 creates a safe harbor from claims of 
market manipulation in the case of share repurchases (see Simpson Thacher report28 for limitations 
and restrictions that apply to Rule 10b-18). In November 2003, the SEC drastically restricted the 
applicability of this share repurchases safe harbor for most non-cash M&A. The 2003 ruling did not 
prohibit share repurchases while M&A transactions were pending, but it significantly increased the 
risk of in-depth regulatory scrutiny in such cases. The November 2003 amendment applied only to 
non-cash transactions, such that it created new incentives for acquirers to pay in cash and thereby 
benefit from Rule 10b-18’s safe harbor. Accordingly, we test whether our results are robust to this 
regulatory change by including a 𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 dummy variable (equal to one for transactions 
26 We used a restricted set of control variables for this robustness check, due to the limited data availability for 
European firms.  
27 Some European countries allowed immediate acquisition goodwill write-offs in case of purchase accounting 
during the pooling period. The combination of purchase accounting with such immediate write-offs effectively 
lead purchase accounting to be more similar to pooling. Such an option could therefore compromise the validity 
of using European evidence as a counterfactual to the U.S. Immediate write-offs were forbidden after 1998 (see 
Amel-Zadeh et al., 2015). Thus, we replicate Panel F analysis starting after 1998. Our results are robust to this 
issue (available on request). We thank an anonymous referee for mentioning this issue. 
28 See http://www.stblaw.com/docs/default-source/cold-fusion-existing-
content/publications/pub392.pdf?sfvrsn=2 
22 | P a g e  
 
                                                          
announced after November 2003) and an additional 𝑈𝑈. 𝑈𝑈.  ×  𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 interaction term in our 
differences-in-differences specification. As the results in Table 10, Panel H, reveal, the 𝑈𝑈. 𝑈𝑈.  × 𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 coefficient remains negative and strongly significant in both differences-in-differences 
specifications, whereas the 𝑈𝑈. 𝑈𝑈.  × 𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 interaction coefficient is significant only in the 
specification with year fixed effects (p = 0.09). The previous results are thus robust to the SEC Rule 
10b-18 share repurchases safe harbor amendments of 2003. 
 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
This analysis of the evolution of full stock payments in M&A transactions in the U.S. in 
recent decades shines a light on the striking, sharp decline in the percentage of transactions fully paid 
in stock after 2001. The consistency of about 10% of stock-paid transactions since 2010 suggests that 
we are not exaggerating when we note the marginalization of this payment mode. Because 2001 is the 
year that pooling and goodwill amortization were abolished in the U.S. (SFAS 141 and 142), we test 
whether this accounting rule change could have had such far-reaching implications. The question is 
particularly relevant, because the choice of a mode of payment in M&As represents a sort of 
laboratory to test various theoretical predictions from corporate finance.  
Testing for the effects of pooling abolishment is challenging because it happened just once. 
Therefore, convincing empirical evidence requires a carefully chosen identification strategy. We use a 
differences-in-differences test with Canada as a counterfactual for the U.S. experience. The Canadian 
economy is closely tied the U.S. economy, and both share many common latent factors. Moreover, the 
evolution of Canada’s pooling regulations creates a particularly interesting way to test the pooling 
hypothesis. Pooling was also abolished in 2001 in Canada, but it had rarely been used previously, 
unlike in the U.S. Using Canada as a placebo for the pooling abolishment treatment in the U.S., we 
test whether the U.S. abolishment was an effective medication (explain the decreasing in full stock 
payment). With large samples of M&A transactions between 1990 and 2014, our results clearly 
support the notion that pooling abolishment dramatically reduced full stock acquisitions. Our 
complementary analyses reveal that CEO incentives contribute to the impact of pooling abolishment.  
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Figure 1. Percentage of fully stock-paid M&A transactions in the U.S. during 1990–2014 
Figure 1 displays the percentage of fully stock-paid M&A transactions in the U.S. from 1990 to 2014 
(count and value based). The sample is collected from the Thomson SDC database, using the selection 
criteria listed in Section 1, which produced a set of 6,955 M&A transactions. 
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Figure 2. Pooling versus purchase in the U.S. and Canada during 1990–2001  
Figure 2 displays the average percentage of M&A transactions in our sample (Table 1) that used 
pooling and had a deal size greater than USD 100 million and were fully paid by stock during 1990–
2001 (source: Thomson SDC Database). Panel A reports the count-based percentage, and Panel B the 
value-based percentage. 
 
A. Count-based percentages 
 
 
B. Value-based percentages 
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Figure 3. Forecasted frequency of full stock payments in the U.S. and Canada 
Figure 3 represents the evolution of the percentage of M&A transactions fully paid in stock from 1990 
to 2014 (Panel A for the U.S., Panel B for Canada). The corresponding M&A samples are in Table 1. 
% Stock refers to the observed percentage. Estimated % Stock is obtained using the fitted 
probabilities from the linear probability models in Table 7, column 1990/2001. 
 
A. U.S. 
 
 
B. Canada 
 
 
  
29 | P a g e  
 
Figure 4. Percentage of stock-paid M&A transactions in the U.S., Europe, and United Kingdom 
during 1990–2014 
Figure 4 displays the percentage of fully stock-paid M&A transactions in the U.S., Europe, and 
United Kingdom from 1990 to 2014 (count-based). The sample is collected from the Thomson SDC 
database, using the selection criteria listed in Section 1, which lead to sample sizes of 6,955 U.S. 
transactions and 6,285 European (41 countries) transactions, of which 3,679 are U.K. transactions. 
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Table 1. M&A sample 
Table 1 presents the M&A samples for the U.S. and Canada. The Thomson SDC database is our data 
source. The sample selection criteria are: deal size above USD 1 million, public acquirers (no 
restriction on target status), deal value to acquirer size of at least 1%, exchange offers, acquisition of 
assets, acquisition of certain assets, buybacks, recaps and acquisition (of stock) excluded, percentage 
of shares acquired between 50% and 100%, 100% of shares hold after transaction, consideration 
offered reported by the Thomson SDC database, and financial acquirers (SIC codes 6000 to 6999) 
excluded. Values are reported in 2010 constant million USD for comparability through time and 
between the U.S. and Canada.  
 
    U.S. Canada 
Year 
Number of 
Deals 
Value of 
Deals 
Number of 
Deals 
Value of 
Deals 
1990 86 10,679 4 93 
1991 141 17,044 4 135 
1992 188 22,208 5 863 
1993 226 23,133 8 801 
1994 296 43,621 13 1,052 
1995 396 54,256 24 3,223 
1996 431 69,443 35 4,195 
1997 511 105,110 30 2,913 
1998 536 90,868 23 3,123 
1999 476 104,495 36 2,918 
2000 482 94,601 41 4,266 
2001 258 40,704 43 6,570 
2002 237 35,501 55 5,155 
2003 236 34,623 70 4,971 
2004 284 40,858 94 8,890 
2005 322 45,540 122 6,876 
2006 273 45,345 149 13,100 
2007 276 46,672 169 15,249 
2008 203 27,656 138 11,434 
2009 175 23,034 143 7,848 
2010 195 34,473 123 10,666 
2011 191 28,627 122 10,731 
2012 165 26,713 92 7,549 
2013 178 29,197 74 5,269 
2014 193 28,273 95 8,917 
Total 6,955  1,122,675 1,712 146,807 
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Table 2. Fully stock-paid transaction percentages by year and structural break test 
Panel A presents the time series of fully stock-paid M&A transaction percentages in the U.S. and 
Canada, from 1990 to 2014, in value (2010 USD constant) and count. The grand average is the 
average across the sample of M&A transactions. Panel B displays a Chow test of the structural break 
with a known change of structure date (estimated for 1990–2014 for the U.S. and 1993–2014 for 
Canada). Trend is a linear time trend variable, and post is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 for the 
post pooling abolishment period. The Coeff, p-val, R2, and Number are the coefficient, p-value, R-
square, and number of observations, respectively. The Chow test is the Fisher statistics of a joint test 
of significance on the Postpool dummy variable coefficient and its interaction with the linear time trend 
coefficient. 
 
A. Stock-paid transaction percentages by year 
  U.S. Canada 
Year 
% Stock Paid 
(Value) 
% Stock Paid 
(Count) 
% Stock Paid 
(Value) 
% Stock Paid 
(Count) 
1990 68.98% 50.00% 58.07% 50.00% 
1991 46.51% 48.23% 95.07% 75.00% 
1992 48.54% 54.79% 11.91% 80.00% 
1993 40.02% 46.02% 72.43% 37.50% 
1994 48.47% 51.35% 26.46% 38.46% 
1995 58.10% 55.81% 7.44% 37.50% 
1996 52.71% 58.93% 30.96% 37.14% 
1997 43.74% 53.82% 32.13% 53.33% 
1998 48.23% 49.07% 18.98% 43.48% 
1999 52.92% 57.14% 28.23% 33.33% 
2000 61.90% 56.85% 22.85% 34.15% 
2001 39.45% 41.86% 42.15% 44.19% 
2002 25.06% 33.76% 38.16% 38.18% 
2003 22.66% 32.20% 35.02% 44.29% 
2004 19.99% 25.35% 36.41% 53.19% 
2005 18.69% 24.53% 64.06% 50.00% 
2006 14.23% 20.51% 49.70% 41.61% 
2007 12.64% 21.38% 35.17% 40.24% 
2008 14.81% 27.59% 58.48% 47.83% 
2009 14.97% 30.86% 38.94% 59.44% 
2010 14.78% 25.13% 22.62% 46.34% 
2011 7.55% 20.94% 26.74% 39.34% 
2012 8.17% 19.39% 16.08% 46.74% 
2013 5.97% 19.66% 28.46% 48.65% 
2014 10.91% 21.76% 33.94% 48.42% 
Grand average 35.80% 41.22% 37.18% 45.79% 
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B. Structural break test 
  US Canada 
  Coeff p-val Coeff p-val 
Postpool x Trend -0.0093 (0.12) 0.0010 (0.88) 
Postpool -0.1073 (0.07) 0.0251 (0.77) 
Trend 0.0011 (0.84) 0.0020 (0.72) 
Constant 0.5130 (0.00) 0.3832 (0.00) 
R² 91.24% 
 
25.87% 
 Number 25 
 
22 
 Chow test 12.44 (0.00) 0.27 (0.76) 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics 
Table 3 Panel A reports the descriptive statistics for the set of payment mode determinants classically used in M&A literature (see Eckbo et al. 2014) that we 
used in our main analysis for the U.S. (Panel A.1) and for Canada (Panel A.2). The M&A samples for the U.S. and Canada are presented in Table 1. 
1990/2001 is the pre pooling abolishment period, and 2002/2014 is the post pooling period. Stdev stands for standard deviation. Statistics are computed on 
yearly averages. Diff Avg is a standard test of difference of means. Table 3 Panel B reports the descriptive statistics of the variables used in complementary 
analyses focusing on the US sample only. Reported figures are for the largest available number of observations for each variable. All variables are defined in 
Appendix 1. 
 
A.1. U.S. 
 
  1990/2014 1990/2001 2002/2014 
Diff 
Avg 
  Mean Median Stdev Mean Mean p-val 
Deal Size (Million USD) 130 128 33 111 147 (0.01) 
Acquirer Size (Million USD) 1,624 1,504 749 1,236 1,983 (0.01) 
Acquirer Cash 16.36% 16.66% 2.30% 15.19% 17.45% (0.01) 
Acquirer Market to Book 2.59 2.38 1.02 3.05 2.16 (0.03) 
Acquirer Tangibility 38.95% 38.63% 4.60% 41.12% 36.94% (0.02) 
Acquirer Research and Development 6.15% 5.63% 1.59% 5.83% 6.44% (0.34) 
Acquirer Dividend 24.34% 23.31% 6.83% 24.41% 24.28% (0.96) 
Acquirer Leverage 15.08% 14.97% 1.40% 14.75% 15.40% (0.25) 
Public Target 30.45% 29.71% 8.19% 35.29% 25.99% (0.00) 
Private Target 54.92% 55.58% 6.37% 52.69% 56.98% (0.10) 
Relative Size 0.55 0.53 0.16 0.46 0.64 (0.00) 
Horizontal  35.76% 35.15% 3.33% 33.82% 37.55% (0.00) 
Domestic  85.49% 85.07% 5.59% 90.19% 81.14% (0.00) 
10 Year Interest Rate 6.33% 6.51% 1.49% 7.63% 5.13% (0.00) 
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A.2. Canada 
 
  1990/2014 1990/2001 2002/2014 
Diff 
Avg 
  Mean Median Stdev Mean Mean p-val 
Deal Size (Million USD) 76 82 25 74 78 (0.71) 
Acquirer Size (Million USD) 483 400 313 310 643 (0.00) 
Acquirer Cash 11.11% 10.91% 5.85% 6.59% 15.29% (0.00) 
Acquirer Market to Book 1.88 1.64 0.80 1.66 2.09 (0.18) 
Acquirer Tangibility 77.16% 68.72% 21.93% 87.13% 67.97% (0.03) 
Acquirer Research and Development 1.75% 1.36% 1.71% 1.07% 2.38% (0.05) 
Acquirer Dividend 21.56% 21.21% 11.80% 21.14% 21.95% (0.87) 
Acquirer Leverage 14.45% 13.36% 7.36% 19.81% 9.51% (0.00) 
Public Target 49.30% 47.30% 14.31% 59.34% 40.03% (0.00) 
Private Target 38.15% 40.00% 13.64% 30.48% 45.23% (0.01) 
Relative Size 1.29 1.13 0.76 1.65 0.95 (0.02) 
Horizontal  55.65% 55.80% 11.02% 59.00% 52.56% (0.16) 
Domestic 76.42% 72.73% 12.59% 82.39% 70.91% (0.02) 
10 Year Interest Rate 5.36% 5.33% 2.33% 7.28% 3.60% (0.00) 
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B. U.S. – complementary analyses 
 
Variable      Mean      Median      Stdev        N 
% Variable Compensation 71.78% 78.73% 23.19% 1,146 
10 Year Interest Rate 6.65% 6.81% 1.21% 1,157 
Acquirer CAR 1.59% 0.93% 11.70% 5,148 
Acquirer Free Cash Flow -0.0197 0.0427 0.2274 5,148 
Credit Spread 2.65% 2.22% 1.45% 1,157 
High Tech 47.19% 0.00% 49.94% 1,157 
Hostile 0.47% 0.00% 6.81% 5,148 
Manufacturing 20.05% 0.00% 40.06% 1,157 
Pooling Hat 36.29% 34.49% 18.47% 1,157 
Run Up 1.1745 1.0248 0.6808 5,148 
Sigma 3.83% 3.27% 2.30% 5,148 
Step Up 3.19 1.88 5.29 1,157 
Stock 37.60% 0.00% 48.44% 5,148 
Target Leverage 15.24% 5.84% 19.58% 1,157 
Target Return On Assets -2.02% 4.46% 23.43% 1,157 
Target Size (Million USD) 168 102 185 1,157 
Tender Offer 8.76% 0.00% 28.27% 5,148 
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Table 4. Determinants of the probability of full stock payment 
Table 4 displays the results of a linear probability model of full stock payments using the set of mode 
of payment choice determinants classically used in prior literature (Eckbo et al. 2014). All variables 
are defined in Appendix 1. Sector FE indicates whether industry fixed effects are included. R2 stands 
for R-square, Number indicates the number of observations, Coeff is the variable coefficient, and p-
val refers to the p-value. 
 
 
  
  U.S. Canada 
  Coeff p-val Coeff p-val 
Acquirer Size -0.0057 (0.18) -0.0259 (0.02) 
Relative Size 0.0066 (0.48) -0.0016 (0.90) 
Acquirer Leverage -0.2032 (0.00) -0.2649 (0.03) 
Acquirer Market to Book 0.0197 (0.00) 0.0226 (0.00) 
Acquirer Tangibility -0.0594 (0.01) 0.0105 (0.84) 
Acquirer Dividend -0.0605 (0.00) -0.1340 (0.00) 
Acquirer Research and 
Development 0.4451 (0.00) 0.6816 (0.00) 
Acquirer Cash -0.0393 (0.37) -0.1023 (0.32) 
Domestic 0.0787 (0.00) 0.1446 (0.00) 
Horizontal -0.0163 (0.21) 0.0551 (0.10) 
Public Target 0.0670 (0.00) 0.2434 (0.00) 
10 Year Interest Rate 11.4812 (0.00) 0.0870 (0.93) 
Sector FE yes   yes   
R² 20.83% 
 
30.46% 
 Number 5,337 
 
786 
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Table 5. Method of payment and pooling abolishment: differences-in-differences test 
Table 5 reports the results of two differences-in-differences test specifications. The dependent 
variable is the full stock payment dummy variable (equal to 1 if the transaction is fully paid in stock). 
The M&A sample for the U.S. and Canada is introduced in Table 1. Variables are defined in 
Appendix 1. Both specifications rely on a linear probability model. In Column 1, the post dummy 
variable (equal to 1 for the post–pooling abolishment period) is explicitly introduced. In Column 2, 
we introduce year fixed effects (Year FE). US x Postpool is the interaction term between the U.S. and 
Postpool dummy variables. The set of control variables is the same as in Table 4. Sector FE indicates 
whether industry fixed effects are included. R2 stands for R-square, Number for the number of 
observations, Coeff for the variable coefficient, and p-val for p-value. Standard errors are robust to 
heteroskedascity. 
 
  (1) (2) 
           Coeff p-val          Coeff p-val 
US Dummy 0.1568 (0.00) 0.1183 (0.00) 
Postpool Dummy 0.0198 (0.66) 
  US x Postpool -0.3134 (0.00) -0.2099 (0.00) 
Acquirer Size 0.0048 (0.51) 0.0049 (0.51) 
Relative Size -0.0053 (0.17) -0.0037 (0.35) 
Acquirer Leverage -0.2182 (0.00) -0.2161 (0.00) 
Acquirer Market to Book 0.0173 (0.00) 0.0191 (0.00) 
Acquirer Tangibility -0.0469 (0.03) -0.0485 (0.03) 
Acquirer Dividend -0.0826 (0.00) -0.0827 (0.00) 
Acquirer Research and Development 0.4507 (0.00) 0.4369 (0.00) 
Acquirer Cash -0.0157 (0.69) -0.0146 (0.71) 
Domestic 0.1013 (0.00) 0.0993 (0.00) 
Horizontal -0.0046 (0.70) -0.0065 (0.58) 
Public Target 0.0853 (0.00) 0.0820 (0.00) 
10 Year Interest Rate 2.2224 (0.00) -1.0835 (0.49) 
Sector FE yes 
 
yes 
 Year FE no   yes   
R² 23.46% 
 
24.19% 
 Number 6,123 
 
6123 
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Table 6. CEO incentives and the probability of full stock payment 
Table 6 panel A displays the results of a linear probability model of full stock payment determinants. The variables of interest are the proportion of CEO 
variable compensation (% Variable Compensation) and its interaction with Postpool dummy (dummy variable = 1 for the post–pooling abolishment period). 
All variables are defined in Appendix 1. Sector FE (Year FE) indicates whether industry (year) fixed effects are included. R2 stands for R-square, Number for 
the number of observations, Coeff for the variable coefficient, and p-val for p-value. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedascity. The F-test is the Fisher 
statistics of a test of significance for the sum of the coefficients %Variable Compensation and %Variable compensation x Postpool. Panel B displays results 
obtained using Panel A, Column 4 specification for subsamples build on Acquirer Return on Assets and Market to Book Ratios. High (Low) ROA 
corresponds to the subsample of acquirers with Return on Assets above (below) the sample median Return on Assets. The same criteria apply to High (Low) 
MTB, using the acquirer Market to Book ratio. Sample medians are recomputed each year.  
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A. Probability of full stock payment – all sample 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Coeff p-val Coeff p-val Coeff p-val Coeff p-val 
Postpool Dummy -0.4358 (0.00) -0.2382 (0.01) -0.2598 (0.00) 
  % Variable Compensation 
  
0.1012 (0.20) 0.0839 (0.31) 0.0943 (0.23) 
%Variable Compensation x Postpool 
  
-0.2863 (0.01) -0.2625 (0.02) -0.2748 (0.01) 
Acquirer Size -0.0004 (0.96) -0.0327 (0.00) -0.0401 (0.00) -0.0335 (0.01) 
Relative Size -0.0337 (0.00) 0.0043 (0.67) -0.0001 (0.99) 0.0083 (0.42) 
Acquirer Leverage -0.1680 (0.01) -0.1575 (0.02) -0.1534 (0.05) -0.1247 (0.11) 
Acquirer Market to Book 0.0250 (0.00) 0.0252 (0.00) 0.0255 (0.00) 0.0257 (0.00) 
Acquirer Tangibility -0.0049 (0.89) -0.0012 (0.97) -0.0156 (0.73) -0.0047 (0.92) 
Acquirer Dividend -0.0597 (0.01) -0.0619 (0.01) -0.0362 (0.14) -0.0541 (0.03) 
Acquirer Research and Development 0.6010 (0.00) 0.5654 (0.00) 0.5013 (0.01) 0.4483 (0.02) 
Acquirer Cash -0.0536 (0.55) -0.0336 (0.71) -0.0815 (0.38) -0.0467 (0.61) 
Domestic 0.0673 (0.00) 0.0618 (0.01) 0.0709 (0.00) 0.0679 (0.01) 
Horizontal 0.0170 (0.44) 0.0135 (0.53) 0.0022 (0.92) 0.0070 (0.76) 
Public Target 0.0019 (0.93) 0.0020 (0.93) 0.0055 (0.81) 0.0003 (0.99) 
10 Year Interest Rate 1.3119 (0.33) 1.0624 (0.43) 0.8766 (0.54) -8.1663 (0.08) 
Credit Spread 1.4140 (0.01) 1.4986 (0.01) 1.5976 (0.01) 5.0953 (0.08) 
Year FE no 
 
no 
 
no 
 
yes 
 Sector FE no   no   yes   yes   
R² 36.62% 
 
36.84% 
 
39.63% 
 
42.19% 
 Number 1,146 
 
1,146 
 
1,146 
 
1,146 
 F-test  - - 5.78 (0.02) 4.74 (0.03) 5.82 (0.02) 
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B. Probability of full stock payment – High/Low ROA and High/Low MTB subsamples 
  
(1) 
High ROA 
(2) 
Low ROA 
(3) 
High MTB 
(4)  
Low MTB 
  Coeff p-val Coeff p-val Coeff p-val Coeff p-val 
% Variable Compensation 0.1957 (0.11) -0.0142 (0.90) 0.0893 (0.37) 0.0355 (0.79) 
%Variable Compensation x Postpool -0.2923 (0.04) -0.2675 (0.06) -0.2531 (0.04) -0.2271 (0.19) 
Acquirer Size 0.0044 (0.76) 0.0198 (0.20) 0.0092 (0.46) 0.0046 (0.79) 
Relative Size -0.0160 (0.85) -0.0308 (0.06) -0.0567 (0.63) -0.0268 (0.09) 
Acquirer Leverage -0.2248 (0.05) -0.0583 (0.64) -0.0310 (0.79) -0.0537 (0.66) 
Acquirer Market to Book 0.0375 (0.00) 0.0127 (0.08) 0.0088 (0.13) -0.0232 (0.71) 
Acquirer Tangibility -0.0636 (0.28) 0.0429 (0.54) 0.0058 (0.92) 0.0350 (0.62) 
Acquirer Dividend -0.0340 (0.29) -0.0432 (0.32) -0.0200 (0.54) -0.0785 (0.05) 
Acquirer Research and 
Development 0.2963 (0.33) 0.4646 (0.07) 0.3674 (0.05) 0.2636 (0.58) 
Acquirer Cash -0.0963 (0.46) 0.0174 (0.89) -0.1456 (0.14) 0.2345 (0.23) 
Domestic 0.0308 (0.42) 0.1031 (0.01) 0.0636 (0.04) 0.0689 (0.07) 
Horizontal 0.0122 (0.72) 0.0123 (0.73) -0.0140 (0.64) 0.0425 (0.25) 
Public Target -0.0415 (0.24) 0.0335 (0.34) 0.0296 (0.33) 0.0143 (0.70) 
10 Year Interest Rate -12.0159 (0.05) -5.0140 (0.47) -13.4634 (0.03) -3.0293 (0.67) 
Credit Spread 3.9745 (0.30) 5.6257 (0.23) 5.6392 (0.16) 5.1211 (0.27) 
Year FE yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 Sector FE yes   yes   yes   yes   
R² 53.50% 
 
38.79% 
 
64.70% 
 
26.33% 
 Number 567 
 
579 
 
565 
 
581 
 F-test  1.04 (0.31) 6.55 (0.01) 2.87 (0.09) 2.06 (0.15) 
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Table 7. Determinants of the probability of full stock payment 
Table 7 displays the results of a linear probability model of full stock payment using the set of mode 
of payment choice determinants classically used in prior literature (Eckbo et al. 2014) by sub-period 
(pooling and post–pooling abolishment periods). Panel A reports the U.S. results, and Panel B reports 
the results for Canada. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. Sector FE indicates whether industry 
fixed effects are included. Diff Coeff is a test of coefficient differences between the pooling and post–
pooling abolishment periods, obtained by estimating a pooled specification with interaction terms. R2 
stands for R-square, Number for the number of observations, Coeff for the variable coefficient, and p-
val for p-value. 
 
A. U.S., pooling and post–pooling abolishment periods 
  1990/2001 2002/2014 
Diff 
Coeff 
  Coeff p-val Coeff p-val p-val 
Acquirer Size 0.0263 (0.00) -0.0484 (0.00) (0.00) 
Relative Size 0.0083 (0.42) 0.0366 (0.08) (0.22) 
Acquirer Leverage -0.3784 (0.00) 0.0223 (0.67) (0.00) 
Acquirer Market to Book 0.0103 (0.00) 0.0056 (0.37) (0.49) 
Acquirer Tangibility -0.1046 (0.00) 0.0427 (0.19) (0.00) 
Acquirer Dividend -0.1115 (0.00) -0.0406 (0.02) (0.01) 
Acquirer Research and 
Development 0.4103 (0.00) 0.4722 (0.00) (0.95) 
Acquirer Cash -0.0090 (0.88) -0.0040 (0.94) (0.59) 
Domestic 0.1128 (0.00) 0.0342 (0.06) (0.01) 
Horizontal -0.0167 (0.35) -0.0023 (0.88) (0.55) 
Public Target 0.0170 (0.36) 0.1471 (0.00) (0.00) 
10 Year Interest Rate 1.5629 (0.22) 3.8250 (0.00) (0.15) 
Sector FE yes   yes     
R² 15.93% 
 
19.10% 
  Number 3,231 
 
2,106 
  B. Canada, pooling and post–pooling abolishment periods 
  1990/2001 2002/2014 
Diff 
Coeff 
  Coeff p-val Coeff p-val p-val 
Acquirer Size -0.0077 (0.83) -0.0359 (0.00) (0.41) 
Relative Size 0.0147 (0.66) -0.0039 (0.82) (0.60) 
Acquirer Leverage -0.1382 (0.73) -0.3044 (0.03) (0.67) 
Acquirer Market to Book -0.0056 (0.88) 0.0239 (0.00) (0.40) 
Acquirer Tangibility 0.0063 (0.97) 0.0405 (0.47) (0.83) 
Acquirer Dividend -0.2132 (0.11) -0.1253 (0.01) (0.51) 
Acquirer Research and 
Development 2.3846 (0.02) 0.6039 (0.01) (0.31) 
Acquirer Cash 0.1973 (0.60) -0.1634 (0.12) (0.05) 
Domestic 0.0226 (0.86) 0.1589 (0.00) (0.26) 
Horizontal 0.1804 (0.11) 0.0220 (0.55) (0.15) 
Public Target 0.1155 (0.28) 0.2975 (0.00) (0.09) 
10 Year Interest Rate 1.4213 (0.70) 0.7102 (0.68) (0.85) 
Sector FE yes   yes     
R² 26.65% 
 
35.70% 
  Number 165 
 
621 
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Table 8. Probabilities of full stock payments and of pooling: U.S. case  
Table 8 reports the results of a two-stage analysis of the relation between the probability of full stock 
payment and the probability of pooling. The M&A sample for the U.S. is introduced in Table 1, but 
restricted to public targets; the variables are defined in Appendix 1. Panel A presents the first-stage 
probability of pooling analysis. The dependent variable is the pooling dummy variable (equal to 1 in 
the case of pooling). We adopt a classic probit specification. Control variables are selected in 
accordance with existing literature about pooling accounting (Ayers et al. 2002). The estimation is 
performed on the pooling period (1990–2001). Panel B is dedicated to the second-stage probability of 
full stock payment analysis. The dependent variable is the full stock payment dummy variable. Both 
specifications rely on a linear probability model. In Column 1, the Postpool Dummy variable is 
explicitly introduced. In Column 2, we introduce year fixed effects (Year FE). Pooling Hat is the 
fitted probability of pooling, obtained using the first-stage probability of pooling analysis. Postpool x 
Pooling Hat is the interaction term between the Postpool dummy variable and Pooling Hat. The set of 
control variables is the same as in Table 4. Sector FE indicates whether industry fixed effects are 
included. R2 stands for R-square, Pseudo R2 for Pseudo R-square, Number for the number of 
observations, Coeff for the variable coefficient, and p-val for p-value. Standard errors are robust to 
heteroskedascity. 
 
A. First-stage probability of pooling  
 
 
         Coeff p-val  
Step Up 0.0215 (0.05)  
Target Return On Assets 0.8622 (0.01)  
Target Leverage -0.9644 (0.00)  
Target Size 0.1653 (0.00)  
Relative Size -0.0478 (0.48)  
Acquirer Size 0.0346 (0.50)  
Acquirer Leverage -0.3756 (0.27)  
Acquirer Cash 0.2968 (0.51)  
Acquirer Market to Book 0.0473 (0.27)  
Acquirer Tangibility -0.0412 (0.80)  
Acquirer Dividend -0.2254 (0.08)  
Run Up 0.2123 (0.03)  
High Tech -0.0333 (0.80)  
Manufacturing -0.6501 (0.00)  
Pseudo R² 13.22% 
 
 
Number 729 
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B. Second-stage probability of full stock payment, linear probability model 
 
  (1) (2) 
           Coeff p-val        Coeff p-val 
Postpool Dummy 0.1922 (0.01) 
  Pooling Hat 0.9336 (0.00) 0.8419 (0.00) 
Postpool x Pooling Hat -1.1326 (0.00) -0.9740 (0.00) 
Acquirer Size -0.0688 (0.00) -0.0640 (0.00) 
Relative Size -0.0474 (0.00) -0.0490 (0.00) 
Acquirer Leverage -0.1396 (0.15) -0.1154 (0.23) 
Acquirer Market to Book 0.0185 (0.10) 0.0200 (0.07) 
Acquirer Tangibility -0.0312 (0.56) -0.0244 (0.66) 
Acquirer Dividend -0.0538 (0.13) -0.0530 (0.14) 
Acquirer Research and Development 0.3939 (0.01) 0.4337 (0.01) 
Acquirer Cash 0.0791 (0.48) 0.1065 (0.33) 
Domestic 0.1091 (0.14) 0.1456 (0.05) 
Horizontal -0.0465 (0.10) -0.0433 (0.12) 
Public Target 0.0023 (0.98) 0.0247 (0.85) 
10 Year Interest Rate 1.5632 (0.38) -7.2418 (0.14) 
Credit Spread 1.1686 (0.26) 9.7964 (0.01) 
Sector FE yes 
 
yes 
 Year FE no   yes   
R² 27.85% 
 
29.66% 
 Number 1,157 
 
1,157 
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Table 9. Method of payment, pooling abolishment, and value effects: U.S. case  
Table 9 reports the results of cross-sectional regressions of acquirer CAR on a large set of 
determinants classically used in prior literature (Golubov et al. 2015), dummy variables identifying 
the post–pooling abolishment period (Postpool), fully stock paid acquisitions (Stock), public targets 
(Public Target), and their interactions. The M&A sample for the U.S. is introduced in Table 1, and the 
variables are defined in Appendix 1. The CAR are obtained using the market model as a return-
generating process (estimation window from day -300 to day -90 relative to the announcement date) 
and a three-day event window centered on the announcement date. Column 1 displays the results for 
the baseline specification. Column 2 adds the dummy variables of interest and their interactions. 
Sector FE (Year FE) indicates whether industry (year) fixed effects are included. R2 stands for R-
square, Number for the number of observations, Coeff for the variable coefficient, and p-val for p-
value. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedascity.  
 
  (1) (2) 
  Coeff p-val Coeff p-val 
Postpool Dummy 
  
-0.0033 (0.50) 
Postpool x Stock 
  
0.0116 (0.39) 
Postpool x Public Target 
  
0.0132 (0.07) 
Postpool x Stock x Public Target 
 
-0.0463 (0.01) 
Stock 0.0087 (0.10) 0.0081 (0.18) 
Public Target -0.0190 (0.00) -0.0272 (0.00) 
Stock x Public Target -0.0365 (0.00) -0.0242 (0.01) 
Relative Size 0.0187 (0.00) 0.0192 (0.00) 
Acquirer Size -0.0022 (0.18) -0.0033 (0.02) 
Acquirer Market to Book -0.0002 (0.75) -0.0005 (0.48) 
Acquirer Free Cash Flow -0.0016 (0.90) -0.0013 (0.92) 
Domestic -0.0007 (0.87) -0.0004 (0.94) 
Horizontal -0.0025 (0.47) -0.0023 (0.52) 
Sigma 0.5220 (0.02) 0.3543 (0.08) 
Run Up -0.0013 (0.68) -0.0007 (0.82) 
Hostile -0.0033 (0.83) -0.0046 (0.78) 
Tender Offer 0.0123 (0.02) 0.0135 (0.01) 
Sector FE yes 
 
yes 
 Year FE yes   no   
R² 8.58% 
 
7.63% 
 Number 5,148 
 
5,148 
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Table 10. Robustness checks  
Table 10 summarizes the robustness checks of the results in Table 5, our baseline differences-in-
differences test of the pooling abolishment hypothesis. In Panel A, we excluded high-technology 
firms (Kile and Phillips 2009). In Panel B, we restrict the sample to domestic deals. In Panel C, we 
restrict the sample to U.S. acquirers that undertook at least one transaction in the five years before and 
another transaction in the five years after pooling abolishment. In Panel D, we control for Canadian 
cross-listed firms. Panel E (F) reports the results of our differences-in-differences test specifications 
using Europe (UK) as a counterfactual. Panel G reports the results of a treatment effect test with 
propensity score matching to avoid the use of non-U.S. transactions as counterfactual. Panel H reports 
an additional differences-in-differences test controlling for the 2003 SEC amendments to the share 
repurchases safe harbor. 
A. Internet bubble  
  (1) (2) 
  Coeff p-val Coeff p-val 
US Dummy 0.1484 (0.00) 0.1441 (0.00) 
Postpool Dummy 0.0426 (0.41) 
  US x Postpool -0.2410 (0.00) -0.1777 (0.00) 
Acquirer Size -0.0083 (0.30) -0.0074 (0.36) 
Relative Size -0.0120 (0.03) -0.0092 (0.10) 
Acquirer Leverage -0.2888 (0.00) -0.2877 (0.00) 
Acquirer Market to Book 0.0237 (0.01) 0.0247 (0.00) 
Acquirer Tangibility -0.0246 (0.37) -0.0289 (0.29) 
Acquirer Dividend -0.0684 (0.00) -0.0702 (0.00) 
Acquirer Research and Development 0.8465 (0.00) 0.8396 (0.00) 
Acquirer Cash -0.0673 (0.31) -0.0746 (0.26) 
Domestic 0.1236 (0.00) 0.1202 (0.00) 
Horizontal -0.0107 (0.52) -0.0129 (0.44) 
Public Target 0.1021 (0.00) 0.1017 (0.00) 
10 Year Interest Rate 1.7386 (0.05) -1.8921 (0.35) 
Sector FE yes 
 
yes 
 Year FE no   yes   
R² 0.2046 
 
0.2116 
 Number 3,273 
 
3,273 
  
  
46 | P a g e  
 
B. Domestic deals 
  (1) (2) 
  Coeff p-val Coeff p-val 
US Dummy 0.1937 (0.00) 0.1291 (0.00) 
Postpool Dummy 0.0804 (0.13) 
  US x Postpool -0.3693 (0.00) -0.2214 (0.00) 
Acquirer Size 0.0077 (0.38) 0.0091 (0.30) 
Relative Size -0.0023 (0.59) -0.0009 (0.83) 
Acquirer Leverage -0.2232 (0.00) -0.2203 (0.00) 
Acquirer Market to Book 0.0167 (0.00) 0.0189 (0.00) 
Acquirer Tangibility -0.0366 (0.12) -0.0392 (0.10) 
Acquirer Dividend -0.0838 (0.00) -0.0825 (0.00) 
Acquirer Research and Development 0.4474 (0.00) 0.4346 (0.00) 
Acquirer Cash -0.0058 (0.89) -0.0071 (0.87) 
Horizontal -0.0054 (0.68) -0.0075 (0.57) 
Public Target 0.0784 (0.00) 0.0766 (0.00) 
10 Year Interest Rate 2.8727 (0.00) -0.6842 (0.70) 
Sector FE yes 
 
yes 
 Year FE no   yes   
R² 23.19% 
 
23.96% 
 Number 5,174 
 
5,174 
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 C. Constant acquirer sample, between [-5,0] and [0,+5] year ranges 
  (1) (2) 
  Coeff p-val Coeff p-val 
US Dummy 0.2464 (0.00) 0.1412 (0.00) 
Postpool Dummy 0.0090 (0.91) 
  US x Postpool -0.3431 (0.00) -0.2079 (0.00) 
Acquirer Size -0.0009 (0.96) -0.0035 (0.84) 
Relative Size -0.0140 (0.23) -0.0147 (0.21) 
Acquirer Leverage -0.3213 (0.00) -0.3137 (0.01) 
Acquirer Market to Book 0.0103 (0.00) 0.0139 (0.00) 
Acquirer Tangibility -0.1070 (0.11) -0.1040 (0.12) 
Acquirer Dividend -0.0302 (0.47) -0.0319 (0.43) 
Acquirer Research and Development 0.6285 (0.00) 0.5594 (0.00) 
Acquirer Cash -0.1349 (0.20) -0.1155 (0.25) 
Domestic 0.0994 (0.01) 0.1051 (0.01) 
Horizontal -0.0085 (0.78) -0.0111 (0.72) 
Public Target 0.0645 (0.04) 0.0649 (0.04) 
10 Year Interest Rate 3.2220 (0.23) 4.5415 (0.36) 
Sector FE yes 
 
yes 
 Year FE no   yes   
R² 0.2783 
 
0.3022 
 N 971 
 
971 
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 D. Controlling for cross-listed Canadian firms 
  (1) (2) 
  Coeff p-val Coeff p-val 
US Dummy 0.1879 (0.00) 0.1442 (0.00) 
Postpool Dummy 0.0283 (0.53) 
  US x Postpool -0.3231 (0.00) -0.2147 (0.00) 
Canadian Cross-listed 0.0707 (0.05) 0.0625 (0.08) 
Acquirer Size 0.0046 (0.53) 0.0047 (0.53) 
Relative Size -0.0064 (0.11) -0.0046 (0.24) 
Acquirer Leverage -0.2186 (0.00) -0.2166 (0.00) 
Acquirer Market to Book 0.0175 (0.00) 0.0193 (0.00) 
Acquirer Tangibility -0.0480 (0.03) -0.0494 (0.02) 
Acquirer Dividend -0.0815 (0.00) -0.0817 (0.00) 
Acquirer Research and Development 0.4479 (0.00) 0.4345 (0.00) 
Acquirer Cash -0.0164 (0.68) -0.0153 (0.70) 
Domestic 0.1035 (0.00) 0.1013 (0.00) 
Horizontal -0.0046 (0.70) -0.0066 (0.58) 
Public Target 0.0846 (0.00) 0.0814 (0.00) 
10 Year Interest Rate 2.1051 (0.00) -1.2655 (0.42) 
Sector FE yes 
 
yes 
 Year FE no   yes   
R² 23.51% 
 
24.23% 
 Number 6,123 
 
6,123 
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E. European countries as counterfactual 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Coeff p-val Coeff p-val Coeff p-val Coeff p-val 
US Dummy 0.3001 (0.00) 0.2986 (0.00) 0.2782 (0.00) 0.2781 (0.00) 
PostPool Dummy -0.0679 (0.00) 
  
-0.0560 (0.00) 
  US x Postpool -0.2221 (0.00) -0.2241 (0.00) -0.2214 (0.00) -0.2238 (0.00) 
Deal Size 
    
-0.0065 (0.01) -0.0063 (0.01) 
Domestic 
    
0.0739 (0.00) 0.0724 (0.00) 
Horizontal 
    
-0.0081 (0.33) -0.0074 (0.37) 
Public Target 
    
0.0765 (0.00) 0.0729 (0.00) 
Sector FE yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 Year FE no   yes   no   yes   
R² 14.12% 
 
14.87% 
 
15.03% 
 
15.70% 
 Number 13,235 
 
13,235 
 
13,235 
 
13,235 
  
F. United Kingdom as counterfactual 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Coeff p-val Coeff p-val Coeff p-val Coeff p-val 
US Dummy 0.3472 (0.00) 0.3402 (0.00) 0.3419 (0.00) 0.3359 (0.00) 
PostPool Dummy -0.0653 (0.00) 
  
-0.0534 (0.00) 
  US x Postpool -0.2278 (0.00) -0.2166 (0.00) -0.2258 (0.00) -0.2150 (0.00) 
Deal Size 
    
-0.0167 (0.00) -0.0161 (0.00) 
Domestic 
    
0.0538 (0.00) 0.0503 (0.00) 
Horizontal 
    
-0.0190 (0.04) -0.0187 (0.04) 
Public Target 
    
0.0827 (0.00) 0.0791 (0.00) 
Sector FE yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 Year FE no   yes   no   yes   
R² 16.78% 
 
17.41% 
 
17.63% 
 
18.17% 
 Number 10,629 
 
10,629 
 
10,629 
 
10,629 
  
G. Treatment effect test with propensity score matching 
Treatment Effect Test       
  Num Obs Mean p-value 
    Average Treatment Effect 
(ATE) 
   Postpool (1 vs. 0) 3,817 -0.3320 (0.00) 
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H. Differences-in-differences test, controlling for SEC Rule 10b-18  
  (1) (2) 
  Coeff p-val Coeff p-val 
US Dummy 0.1652 (0.00) 0.1258 (0.00) 
Postpool Dummy 0.0257 (0.70) 
  Postpurch Dummy -0.0405 (0.50) 
  US x Postpool -0.2752 (0.00) -0.1673 (0.00) 
US x Postpurch -0.0403 (0.52) -0.0727 (0.09) 
Acquirer Size 0.0048 (0.52) 0.0050 (0.50) 
Relative Size -0.0050 (0.20) -0.0036 (0.37) 
Acquirer Leverage -0.2189 (0.00) -0.2154 (0.00) 
Acquirer Market to Book 0.0173 (0.00) 0.0190 (0.00) 
Acquirer Tangibility -0.0467 (0.03) -0.0467 (0.03) 
Acquirer Dividend -0.0811 (0.00) -0.0829 (0.00) 
Acquirer Research and 
Development 0.4449 (0.00) 0.4352 (0.00) 
Acquirer Cash -0.0139 (0.72) -0.0143 (0.71) 
Domestic 0.1008 (0.00) 0.0978 (0.00) 
Horizontal -0.0046 (0.70) -0.0065 (0.58) 
Public Target 0.0820 (0.00) 0.0816 (0.00) 
10 Year Interest Rate 1.2432 (0.11) -0.5847 (0.72) 
Sector FE yes 
 
yes 
 Year FE no   yes   
R² 23.59% 
 
24.23% 
 Number 6,123 
 
6,123 
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Appendix 1. Variable definitions 
 
Variable Definition  Source 
% Variable Compensation Variable component of the acquirer CEO's compensation: (item TDC1-item SALARY)/item TDC1 Execucomp 
10 Year Interest Rate 10-year government bond (US & Canada) interest rate FRED 
Acquirer CAR Acquirer CAR over the three days event windows centered 
on the announcement date, estimated with a market model 
and with an estimation window from day minus 300 to day 
minus 90. CRSP value weighted index is used as proxy for 
the market index 
crsp,sdc 
Acquirer Cash Cash on total asset (item CH/item AT) Compustat 
Acquirer Dividend Dummy equal to 1 if bidder paid dividend previous year, 0 otherwise Compustat 
Acquirer Free Cash Flow Income before extraordinary items (item IBC) divided by total assets (item AT) Compustat 
Acquirer Leverage Acquirer long-term debt (item DLTT) divided by total assets (item AT) Compustat 
Acquirer Market to Book 
Total assets minus common equity (item CEQ) plus the 
market value of equity (item CSHO x item PRCC_F) divided 
by total assets (item AT) 
Compustat 
Acquirer Research and Development In process Research and Development Expense (item RDIP) on total assets (item AT) Compustat 
Acquirer Return On Assets Acquirer Earnings Before Interests and Taxes (item EBIT) on total assets (item AT) Compustat 
Acquirer Size Market value of bidder 42 days before announcement (logarithm is used in multivariate analyses) 
Compustat, 
SDC, DS 
Acquirer Tangibility Property, plant and equipment total (item PPEGT) on total asset (item AT) Compustat 
Canadian Cross-listed Dummy variable equal to 1 if the Canadian is also listed in US Compustat 
Credit Spread Spread Moody corporate aaa FRED 
Deal Size  Deal value in millions USD SDC 
Domestic Dummy equal to 1 if the acquirer and the target country are the same, 0 otherwise SDC 
High Tech Dummy variable equal to 1 if the acquirer is in high-technology sector (Kile and Philips 2009), 0 otherwise SDC 
Horizontal Dummy variable equal to 1 if the acquirer and the target belong to the same SIC code 4-digit, 0 otherwise SDC 
Hostile Dummy variable equal to 1 if the deal is classified as hostile by SDC 0 otherwise SDC 
Manufacturing 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the acquirer is in 
manufacturing sector (SIC code between 2000 and 3999, 
high-technology sectors excluded)  
SDC 
Pooling Hat Estimated probabilities of pooling (See Equation (6)) SDC 
Postpool Dummy 
Dummy equal to 1 if announcement date of the deal is after 
2001 (after 30/06/2001 for daily data), 0 otherwise SDC 
Postpurch Dummy 
Dummy equal to 1 if announcement date of the deal is after 
October 2003, 0 otherwise 
 
Public Target Dummy variable equal to 1 if the target is a public firm, 0 otherwise SDC 
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Relative Size Ratio of deal value on acquirer market value computed in day minus 42 
SDC 
Compustat, 
CRSP 
Datastream 
Run Up Market-adjusted buy and hold return of the acquirer's stock over a 200 day window (-210,-11) CRSP 
Sector FE Sector Fixed Effect (2 digit SIC codes) SDC 
Sigma 
Standard deviation of the market adjusted daily returns of the 
acquirer stock over a 200 day window (from day minus two-
hundreds and ten to day minus eleven relative to the 
announcement date) 
CRSP 
Step Up 
Step-up in target book value, equals to deal value minus 
target Book Equity (Compustat item CEQ) divided by target 
Book Equity 
SDC, 
Compustat 
Stock Dummy variable equal to one if the consideration is stock only and 0 otherwise SDC 
Target Leverage Target long-term debt (item DLTT) divided by total assets (item AT) Compustat 
Target Return On Assets Target Earnings Before Interests and Taxes (item EBIT) on total assets (item AT) Compustat 
Target Size Market value of target forty-two days before announcement (logarithm is used in multivariate analyses) 
SDC, CRSP, 
Datastream 
Tender Offer Dummy variable equal to 1 if the deal is classified as a tender offer by SDC 0 otherwise SDC 
Trend Linear time trend variable (increase of one unit each year)  
US Dummy Dummy equal to 1 if acquirer country is US, 0 otherwise SDC 
Year FE Year Fixed Effect build on the year of deal announcement SDC 
 
Legend:      
- SDC: Thomson SDC M&A database  
 - CRSP: Center for Research in Security Prices database 
 - Compustat: Compustat Fundamental Annual database & Compustat North America 
 - DS: Datastream database  
 - Execucomp: Compustat Execucomp database 
 - FRED: Federal Reserve Economic Data - FRED 
    
53 | P a g e  
 
Appendix 2. Method of payment and pooling abolishment, probit-based results 
Appendix 2 reproduces Table 5, using a probit specification. The dependent variable is the full stock 
payment dummy variable (equal to 1 if the transaction is fully paid in stock). The M&A sample for 
the U.S. and Canada is introduced in Table 1, and the variables are defined in Appendix 1. In Column 
1, the Postpool Dummy variable (equal to 1 for the post–pooling abolishment period) is explicitly 
introduced. In Column 2, we introduce year fixed effects (Year FE). The set of control variables is the 
same as in Table 4. Sector FE indicates whether industry fixed effects are included. R2 stands for R-
square, Number for the number of observations, Coeff for the variable coefficient, and p-val for p-
value. 
 
  (1) (2) 
  Coeff p-val Coeff p-val 
US Dummy 0.4350 (0.00) 0.3449 (0.00) 
Postpool Dummy 0.0940 (0.51) 
  US x Postpool -1.0183 (0.00) -0.6918 (0.00) 
Acquirer Size 0.0127 (0.55) 0.0141 (0.51) 
Relative Size -0.0272 (0.03) -0.0210 (0.11) 
Acquirer Leverage -0.6620 (0.00) -0.6595 (0.00) 
Acquirer Market to Book 0.0627 (0.00) 0.0684 (0.00) 
Acquirer Tangibility -0.1210 (0.09) -0.1316 (0.07) 
Acquirer Dividend -0.3022 (0.00) -0.3057 (0.00) 
Acquirer Research and Development 1.7142 (0.00) 1.6388 (0.00) 
Acquirer Cash -0.0712 (0.57) -0.0583 (0.64) 
Domestic 0.3525 (0.00) 0.3501 (0.00) 
Horizontal -0.0097 (0.80) -0.0157 (0.69) 
Public Target 0.3161 (0.00) 0.3051 (0.00) 
10 Year Interest Rate 8.5784 (0.00) -4.4859 (0.37) 
Sector FE yes 
 
yes 
 Year FE no   yes   
Pseudo R² 20.19% 
 
20.97% 
 Number 6,100 
 
6100 
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